



NONCITIZENS’ ACCESS TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: 
THE NARROWING OF § 1252(b)(9) POST-JENNINGS 
ADAM J. GARNICK† 
When can a noncitizen bring her claims directly before a federal district court? 
The answer is complicated, due in large part to a provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). That provision states that if a 
noncitizen’s claims “arise from” her removal proceedings, they cannot be heard by a 
federal district court. Instead, those claims would be subject to more limited judicial 
review in a federal court of appeals only after the noncitizen’s immigration removal 
proceedings have concluded. If, however, a noncitizen’s claims do not “arise from” 
removal proceedings, § 1252(b)(9) poses no obstacle to district court jurisdiction. In 
these instances, noncitizens may have a more immediate opportunity to obtain judicial 
review and hold the government accountable for its potentially unlawful action. This 
Comment argues that § 1252(b)(9) should be read narrowly in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez. To effectuate that interpretation, this 
Comment offers and evaluates several factors and frameworks that district courts can 
employ when confronted with claims that may implicate § 1252(b)(9). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Efrain and his six-year-old daughter Mia feared being returned to Mexico, 
for they knew what awaited them there.1 Just months earlier, in April 2019, the 
father and daughter fled the violence of their hometown in Guatemala and 
 
1 Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 3d 477 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 
19-03204). This fact pattern is based on E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 
177 (3d Cir. 2020), which reversed in part the district court’s decision in Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 
396 F. Supp. 3d 477 (E.D. Pa. 2019). This Comment uses the pseudonym Efrain for the father. 
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crossed the southern border of the United States.2 But instead of finding the 
refuge they sought, Efrain and Mia were hauled back across the border and 
dropped off in Tijuana, Mexico, without food, shelter, or a guarantee of 
survival.3 They, like nearly 60,000 other migrants, were subject to the Migrant 
Protection Protocols (MPP), a Trump administration policy that forced asylum 
seekers to wait for months in increasingly dangerous and crowded Mexican 
border towns until their appearance in immigration court.4 In Tijuana, Efrain 
and Mia were initially homeless and lived in constant fear for their safety, 
avoiding harm only because they were taken in by a willing stranger.5 
In June, they returned to the United States for their immigration court 
hearing.6 Despite having a viable asylum claim,7 Efrain told the immigration 
judge, on the flawed advice of a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agent, 
that he had no fear of returning to Guatemala and was merely seeking a better 
life for his daughter in the United States.8 Because these are insufficient 
grounds for a grant of asylum, the immigration judge ordered Efrain’s 
removal.9 Rather than appeal his removal, Efrain waived his opportunity to 
do so, fearing that he and his daughter would be sent back to Mexico as they 
awaited another hearing.10 
To prepare for their deportation to Guatemala, the government 
transferred Efrain and Mia across the country, from southern California to 
the Berks County Residential Center—an immigration detention center—in 
Leesport, Pennsylvania.11 There, an attorney took up their case and appealed 
it to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that Efrain’s waiver of appeal 
 
2 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1; see also E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 181 (“[Petitioners] are from 
Mixco, Guatemala, a city plagued by violent crime.”). 
3 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 2; E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 181. 
4 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/WG4V-
KTDA]; see also Miriam Jordan, Appeals Court Allows ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy to Continue Blocking 
Migrants at the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
03/04/us/migrants-border-remain-in-mexico-mpp-court.html [https://perma.cc/8KRN-VXH5] 
(“Since the ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy [MPP] was rolled out in January 2019, many of the estimated 
60,000 migrants required to wait in Mexican border towns for their immigration hearings have been 
victimized by sexual assault, kidnap and torture.”). 
5 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 3. 
6 Id. 
7 Telephone Interview with Mike DePrince, Pro Bono Counsel for Plaintiffs (May 14, 2020) 
(explaining that Efrain and Mia had a viable claim for asylum). 
8 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1, 3-4. 
9 Id. at 3-4. To win a grant of asylum, Efrain would have to demonstrate that he was unwilling 
to return to Guatemala because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
[his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2020) (describing the eligibility and burden of proof for 
asylum applicants). Merely desiring a better life is an insufficient ground for asylum or similar relief. 
10 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 4. 
11 Id. at 3-4. 
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was invalid because he made the decision under duress.12 Filing the appeal 
triggered an automatic stay of removal, but it was unclear whether this stay 
prevented their intermediate return to Mexico or their ultimate removal to 
Guatemala.13 Given this ambiguity, the government took Efrain and Mia 
from the Berks County facility and put them on a plane to California, with 
the intent to return them to Mexico for the pendency of their appeal to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals.14 
In a matter of hours, their pro bono counsel scrambled to draft and file an 
emergency mandamus petition for a preliminary injunction in federal district 
court.15 In their petition, Efrain and Mia alleged, among other things, that 
returning them to Mexico would violate their constitutional and statutory rights 
to counsel, and that they were ineligible to be placed in MPP in the first place.16 
Simply put, they asked the district court to prohibit their return to Mexico. 
The district court declined to do so.17 Instead, it found that it lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Efrain and Mia’s claims under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(9),18 which provides in relevant part: 
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and 
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action 
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under 
this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under 
this section.19 
 
12 Id. at 4 (“Now represented, Plaintiffs initiated an appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals arguing that the abandonment of their asylum claims was made under duress, and thus not 
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.”). 
13 Id.; E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2020). 
14 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 4. 
15 Id. at 4-5; see also Telephone Interview with Mike DePrince, supra note 7 (describing the 
events leading up to the filing of the petition). 
16 E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 181-82. Efrain and Mia also argued that their return to Mexico would 
violate the Flores Agreement and the government’s non-refoulement obligations. Id. at 182. While central 
to the case, these claims did not implicate 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which is the topic of this Comment. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 182. Although it has since been codified, 
§ 1252(b)(9) was originally enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 607-12 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). It was later amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 302-311. The only change that the REAL ID made to the provision 
was to add the following language explicitly prohibiting habeas review: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas 
corpus under section 2241 of Title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus 
provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law 
(statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order of such questions of law or fact. 
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The district court reasoned that the father and daughter’s claims “arose 
from” an “action taken or proceeding brought to remove [them]” from the 
United States, and therefore § 1252(b)(9) precluded district court 
jurisdiction.20 If Efrain and Mia wanted relief, they would have to first bring 
their claims before the immigration judge, then to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, and finally in a petition for review before a court of appeals.21 In 
other words, they would have to return to Mexico and wait to bring their 
claims to a federal court only after trudging through the entire administrative 
appeals process—one that could take months, if not years.22 
Although the district court’s jurisdictional analysis was later overturned 
by the Third Circuit—an outcome that ultimately prevented the government 
from returning Efrain and Mia to Mexico—its initial decision represents a 
larger, and troubling pattern. In dozens of cases like this one, noncitizens 
bring urgent claims to district court, only to face the potentially 
insurmountable hurdle of § 1252(b)(9).23 And when the doors to district court 
are slammed shut, so too are the doors to justice, as noncitizens have no other 
avenues to immediate relief.24 Thus, as Efrain and Mia’s case illustrates, 
whether noncitizen plaintiffs can access federal district court may be the 
difference between relief and removal, freedom and detention, life and death. 
In the years following § 1252(b)(9)’s enactment, several scholars published 
seminal articles addressing the provision and the newly installed judicial 
 
Id. at § 106(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 311, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The Act did not, however, make 
any substantive changes to the provision. In examining the amended provision, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded “[t]he statute now contains an additional sentence on habeas jurisdiction, but the 
operative jurisdiction-channeling language has not changed from 1996.” J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 
1026, 1034 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 132 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that the REAL ID Act did not modify the scope of § 1252(b)(9)). 
20 Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 3d 477, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“[T]his Court 
lacks jurisdiction under Section 1252(b)(9) [over the right-to-counsel claims]”); id. at 487 (“The 
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear [the Migrant Protection Protocol] claim because Section 
1252(b)(9) takes away any such jurisdiction.”). 
21 Id. at 488-89; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(9), (d)(1) (requiring noncitizens to exhaust 
all administrative remedies before bringing claims that “arise from” removal proceedings to federal 
court through a petition for review). A petition for review is “the document filed by, or on behalf 
of, an individual seeking review of an agency decision in a circuit court of appeals.” Practice Advisory: 
How to File A Petition for Review, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/how_to_file_a_p
etition_for_review_2015_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YAP-DN7L]. 
22 See Immigration Court Backlog Jumps While Case Processing Slows, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 8, 
2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516 [https://perma.cc/S658-RCH7] (finding that 
noncitizens may wait many months, if not years, for their hearing before an immigration judge). 
23 See infra Section I.E (discussing the types of claims that § 1252(b)(9) implicates). 
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (explaining that the petition for review process is the only means 
of judicial review for anything swept within the reach of § 1252(b)(9)). 
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review system more broadly, including Professors Lenni B. Benson;25 Gerald 
L. Neuman;26 and Hiroshi Motomura.27 Since 2000, only one other article, 
another student Comment, has addressed the provision, which focused 
specifically on § 1252(b)(9)’s applicability in Bivens actions.28 
This Comment not only aims to address the provision more 
comprehensively, but it also seeks to update the literature in light of Jennings 
v. Rodriguez, in which the Supreme Court squarely addressed the scope of 
§ 1252(b)(9) for the first time in nearly two decades.29 Specifically, this 
 
25 Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration 
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997). In her article, Professor Benson argued that the severe 
restrictions on judicial review under IIRIRA “ha[d] revived the default vehicle for judicial review, 
the writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 1416. She contended that noncitizens are “likely to find a variety of 
ways to try to evade the strictures of [§ 1252(b)(9)].” Id. at 1458. As this Comment will reveal, her 
prediction was correct. However, rather than rely on the phraseology of “evade the strictures,” this 
Comment will demonstrate that many noncitizens have brought and continue to bring claims that 
legitimately fall outside the reach of § 1252(b)(9). Id. 
26 Gerald Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1963 (2000). Professor Neuman’s piece evaluated the contemporaneous “state of the debate” in 
the immigration jurisdiction context and offered important observations about the judicial review 
system ushered in by IIRIRA. Id. at 1964, 1989-97. 
27 Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil 
Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000). Professor Motomura most squarely addressed 
§ 1252(b)(9), noting that the provision “warrants sustained discussion . . . . [because it] has 
widespread practical implications, [and] because it will shape access to federal courts in immigration 
cases.” Id. at 451. In addition to offering a comprehensive analysis of § 1252(b)(9), he contended, 
among other points, that jurisdictional statutes like § 1252(b)(9) “play an underappreciated role in 
shaping our view of the merits of a court challenge.” Id. This Comment leans heavily on Professor 
Motomura’s work but has the benefit of analyzing twenty years of case law. 
28 See Sripriya Narasimhan, Comment, Does “Keep Out!” Mean “Stay Out!”?: The Immigration 
and Nationality Act’s Effect on Access to Federal Courts for Constitutional Actions, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1443 (2010) (evaluating whether § 1252(b)(9) limits federal district court jurisdiction specifically in 
the context of Bivens claims). 
29 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840-41 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). Since 2018, 
when Jennings was decided, the Supreme Court has discussed the provision on multiple occasions, to 
varying extents. In 2019, the Court decided Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 962 (2019), in which it 
essentially reiterated the same positions offered in Jennings. The following year, in 2020, the Court 
discussed the provision in three cases. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070-71 (2020); 
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1689-90 (2020); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020). Although these cases, especially Regents, have an impact on the scope 
of § 1252(b)(9), Jennings remains—by far—the most important recent case to address the provision. 
In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Court analyzed specific language of § 1252(b)(9) to construe the phrase 
“questions of law” used elsewhere in § 1252. See 140 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (analyzing the “zipper clause” of 
§1252(b)(9) and concluding that it must encompass mixed questions of law and fact, including the 
application of law to facts). It did not discuss, much less alter, the scope of § 1252(b)(9). In Nasrallah 
v. Barr, the Court held that a court of appeals should deferentially review factual challenges to denials 
of Convention Against Torture relief. 140 S. Ct. at 1688. In reaching that decision, the Court merely 
summarized the function of § 1252(b)(9) without interpreting or modifying the scope of the provision. 
Id. at 1689-90. Of the three Supreme Court cases that discussed § 1252(b)(9) in the 2020 term, Regents 
had the greatest impact on the provision’s scope. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907. There, the Court held 
that the government’s rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was unlawful. 
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Comment contributes to the literature in two related ways: first, it presents 
an argument that Jennings substantively narrowed earlier interpretations of 
§ 1252(b)(9). Second, it compiles, outlines, and evaluates the various 
frameworks and factors that lower courts have used since Jennings to 
determine whether § 1252(b)(9) prohibits review of the claims before them. 
Part I provides a brief history of judicial review in the immigration context. 
It then describes the purpose and framework of § 1252(b)(9), explains the 
administrative process for immigrants appealing removal decisions, highlights 
the types of claims that may implicate the provision, and introduces the textual 
issues courts grapple with when interpreting § 1252(b)(9). 
Part II provides a summary and analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, where the Court directly 
addressed § 1252(b)(9) for the first time.30 It then traces the evolution of how 
lower courts interpreted and applied § 1252(b)(9) after St. Cyr, with a 
particular focus on the extremely broad reading of § 1252(b)(9) advanced by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and later adopted by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Finally, it summarizes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jennings. 
Part III provides a substantive analysis of Jennings, arguing that it directed 
a narrower interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) than had previously been embraced 
by the First and Ninth Circuits. In turn, it outlines and analyzes the various 
factors lower courts have employed since Jennings, many of which have been 
used to properly effectuate the Court’s narrower interpretation of 
§ 1252(b)(9). Finally, the Appendix provides a comprehensive chart 
summarizing the main district and circuit court cases that have addressed 
§ 1252(b)(9) since Jennings.31 
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION CASES AND 
THE INTRODUCTION OF § 1252(b)(9) 
The story of judicial review in the immigration context has been 
analogized to Sir Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion: for every action there 
is an equal, and opposite, reaction.32 It may be better characterized, however, 
 
Id. at 1901. The Court made two important observations about the scope of § 1252(b)(9). First, that 
the provision is not implicated in this sort of case, where “the parties are not challenging any removal 
proceedings.” Id. at 1907 (emphasis added). Second, the scope of § 1252(b)(9), like that of its 
neighboring provision § 1252(g), is “narrow.” Id. While both observations are helpful, Jennings remains 
the most influential case on the provision. 
30 533 U.S. 289, 292 (2001). 
31 The chart is recent as of November 17, 2020. Although it is widely inclusive, it is not entirely 
exhaustive. It includes only post-Jennings cases in which § 1252(b)(9) was treated in some depth. It 
does not include every case since Jennings that has merely cited the provision in passing. 
32 Benson, supra note 25, at 1419. 
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as a perpetual game of “Whac-a-Mole” in which Congress seeks to smack 
down nearly all avenues of judicial review that surface—particularly those 
that lead to review in federal district court.33 Congress’s intent to curb judicial 
review of immigration decisions was most evident in two laws enacted in 
1996, which categorically eliminated judicial review for certain noncitizens 
and for particular claims. Moreover, all judicial review of final orders of 
removal, as well as any related claims, was to take place solely in a court of 
appeals presented through the petition for review process, leaving few, if any, 
paths for immediate review in federal district court.34 
This Part first traces the history of judicial review prior to these 1996 laws. 
It then outlines how the 1996 legislation reshaped judicial review in a general 
sense before focusing specifically on § 1252(b)(9): Congress’s intent in 
enacting this provision; the potential consequences of its applicability; the 
types of claims that may implicate it; and, finally, its text. 
A. Judicial Review in Immigration Proceedings Before 1996 
Prior to 1955, federal courts reviewed the legality of exclusion and 
deportation of noncitizens exclusively through habeas corpus petitions filed in 
a federal district court.35 Judicial review was expanded in 1955, however, when 
the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)36 
offered an additional avenue for judicial review of deportation orders.37 In 
1956, the Court further extended the opportunity for judicial review under the 
 
33 See id. (“[The 1996] changes are part of the continuing efforts of Congress to control the 
timing, scope, and nature of judicial review of immigration proceedings.”). As this Part 
demonstrates, there has been a seemingly endless cycle of congressional attempts to foreclose 
avenues of judicial review only for the judicial branch to pry them back open. 
34 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), (b)(9) (requiring all claims “arising from” removal proceedings 
to be consolidated into a petition for review with a court of appeals). 
35 Motomura, supra note 27, at 395; see also Neuman, supra note 26, at 1966-67 (“Even before the 
federal government took on the task of regulating immigration, federal courts employed the writ of 
habeas corpus to inquire into the lawfulness of” noncitizens’ presence in the United States). Prior to 
the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, discussed infra Sections I.B-C, there were two types of immigration 
proceedings: deportation proceedings and exclusion proceedings. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. 
INADMISSIBILITY & DEPORTABILITY § 1.4 (2019) (explaining pre-1997 immigration proceedings and 
comparing those proceedings to those mandated under current law). In deportation proceedings, the 
government had to prove the person was deportable, and in exclusion proceedings, the individual had 
to prove that she was admissible. See id. (“Generally, the [Immigration and Naturalization Service] 
had the burden of proving someone was deportable [in deportation hearings] while the non-citizen 
had to prove they were not excludable in exclusion proceedings.”). 
36 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
37 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163; see Shaughnessy 
v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955) (holding that “there is a right to judicial review of deportation 
orders other than by habeas corpus,” and that the remedy sought in this case, judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, “is an appropriate one”). 
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APA, this time to orders of exclusion.38 After these decisions, noncitizens 
could challenge their deportation or exclusion order directly in federal district 
court under the APA, as well as through a habeas petition.39 
This expansion of judicial review “led to many novel and creative challenges 
and, in some notorious cases, lengthy delay in the execution of deportation or 
exclusion orders.”40 Shortly thereafter came the first round of judicial review 
“Whac-a-Mole,” when Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) in 1961, providing the first statutory provision governing—and 
restricting—judicial review of exclusion and deportation orders.41 
For exclusion cases, section 106(b) of the amended INA provided that 
noncitizens could seek review of their final exclusion orders exclusively in 
habeas corpus proceedings in district court—the APA would no longer 
provide a separate avenue for judicial review of such orders.42 
For deportation cases, section 106(a) of the INA set forth the “sole and 
exclusive” procedure for judicial review of final orders of deportation.43 
Under this procedure, noncitizens facing deportation had to first exhaust 
administrative remedies in the immigration system and then seek judicial 
review of their final orders only by filing a petition for review in a court of 
appeals pursuant to the Hobbs Act.44 With one exception provided in section 
106(a)(9), there were no statutorily authorized avenues for litigants to bring 
challenges to deportation orders to a district court.45 
 
38 See Brownell v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 181 (1956) (determining that a noncitizen may 
appropriately pursue either remedy—habeas corpus or a declaratory judgment under the 
Administrative Procedure Act—when challenging an exclusion order). 
39 See David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas 
Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 80 (2006-2007) 
(discussing how noncitizens facing deportation could now challenge their orders under the 
Administrative Procedure Act and through habeas corpus proceedings). 
40 Benson, supra note 25, at 1431. 
41 See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650 (amending the statute to 
include “judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion”); see also Motomura, supra note 27, 
at 395 (“The enactment of § 106 in 1961 was an attempt by Congress to limit opportunities for 
judicial review that the Administrative Procedure Act had opened.”). 
42 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 106(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)) 
(“Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any alien against whom a final order of exclusion 
has been made heretofore or hereafter under the provisions of section 1226 of this title or comparable 
provisions of any prior Act may obtain judicial review of such order by habeas corpus proceedings 
and not otherwise.”) (repealed 1996). 
43 § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (repealed 1996). 
44 Id. The Hobbs Act, which governs review for various administrative agencies, eliminates district 
court jurisdiction and places judicial review solely in the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2351. 
45 “[A]ny alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review 
thereof by habeas corpus proceedings.” INA § 106(a)(9), 75 Stat. 650, 652 (repealed 1996). 
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But despite Congress’s attempt to curtail judicial review in federal district 
court, section 106 left open several significant avenues to such review.46 For one, 
section 106 only applied to review of a “final order” of exclusion or deportation. 
Thus, if a noncitizen challenged a matter outside the ambit of a “final order of 
deportation,” she could bring her claims directly to federal district court.47 
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example, 
a noncitizen challenged an immigration official’s decision to deny a temporary 
stay of deportation while he applied for asylum.48 The Supreme Court found 
that because the denial of the stay was not a determination “made during a 
[deportation] proceeding,” it fell outside the scope of a “final order” and thus 
was not precluded by section 106.49 In other words, because the decision to 
deny a stay was collateral to his final order of deportation, the noncitizen 
could bring his claims challenging the immigration official’s denial directly to 
federal district court.50 
Future litigants relied on Cheng to bring their claims to district court, 
characterizing them as collateral to their “final order” and thus not subject to 
the requirement of section 106 that review of such orders takes place solely in 
a court of appeals through a petition for review.51 
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s decision in McNary v. Haitian Refugee 
Center provided a path around section 106 for noncitizens alleging “pattern 
and practice” violations.52 At issue in McNary was section 210 of the INA, the 
special agricultural worker legalization program (SAW), which was part of 
the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986.53 Under section 210, the 
 
46 See Benson, supra note 25, at 1432 (“[L]itigation soon arose about the type of actions, orders and 
decisions of the agency that were within the term ‘final order.’”). Benson highlights the various types of 
challenges that would fall outside section 106 and thus get into federal district court. Id. at 1433. 
47 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 415 (“If a matter was not included in a ‘final order,’ then 
review was in the district court under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
former INA § 279.”). 
48 392 U.S. 206, 207-08 (1968). 
49 Id. at 216. 
50 Id. Motomura explains that subsequent lower court decisions extended this principle from 
Cheng, where a final removal order had already been issued, to cases where a final removal had not yet 
been issued. Motomura, supra note 27, at 416. For example, Professor Motomura recounts Kavasji v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 675 F.2d 236, 237-39 (7th Cir. 1982), where the government 
ordered a student deported after denying his requests to extend his status and be transferred to another 
school. Id. As Motomura explains, the Seventh Circuit found that such claims fell outside the scope of 
a “final order” and could thus be brought directly to federal district court. Id. 
51 See Benson, supra note 25, at 1457 (describing how litigants relied on Cheng to characterize 
their claims as “outside the scope of a removal order” and thus not limited by the procedures 
prescribed in section 106). 
52 McNary v. Haitan Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 497 (1991). 
53 Id. at 483 (describing statutory requirements for adjusting special agricultural workers’ 
statuses); Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3417 (1986). 
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only means of judicial review for a denied SAW application was with a court 
of appeals through the petition for review process set forth in section 106.54 
Despite the statute’s claims-channeling provision, the McNary plaintiffs 
brought their claims directly to district court alleging a “pattern and practice” 
of procedural due process violations by the government in its administration of 
the SAW program.55 The plaintiffs argued that they should be permitted to 
access federal district court because the administrative procedures did not allow 
SAW applicants the opportunity to challenge adverse evidence, to present 
witnesses, or to communicate effectively as competent interpreters were not 
provided.56 In spite of the claims-channeling provision in the statute—
mandating that all challenges to application denials go to a court of appeals 
through a petition for review—the Supreme Court held that the district court 
retained jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ “pattern and practice” claims.57 
Two factors underpinned the Court’s holding. First, requiring noncitizens 
to individually exhaust administrative remedies per section 106 would be less 
efficient than permitting them to compile and bring claims directly to the 
district court.58 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court was 
concerned that precluding district court jurisdiction would deprive the 
plaintiffs of “meaningful judicial review.”59 Since the administrative process 
at issue failed to develop an adequate record for any subsequent appellate 
court review of the “pattern and practice” claims, the Court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs must be permitted to develop an adequate record in district court.60 
Relying on McNary, litigants were able to find their way into district court 
despite the limitations set forth in section 106 by challenging INS enforcement 
practices and arguing that only a district court could properly develop an adequate 
record for review of such claims.61 
These cases—Cheng and McNary—revealed that what seemed like an ironclad 
judicial review system was, in practice, subject to workarounds. Noncitizens were 
still finding avenues into federal district court. These perceived loopholes led to 
 
54 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 210(e)(3)(A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A)) 
(“There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion 
or deportation under section 1105a of this title.”). If a noncitizen’s SAW application were denied and 
resulted in a deportation order, her only means of judicial review would be to exhaust administrative 
remedies in the immigration system and file a petition for review with a court of appeals. 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)) (repealed 1996). 
55 McNary, 498 U.S. at 483. 
56 Id. at 487-88. 
57 Id. at 484. 
58 Id. at 490. 
59 Id. at 484. 
60 Id. 
61 See Benson, supra note 25, at 1457 n.213 (discussing cases in which noncitizens were successful, 
and unsuccessful, in convincing district courts that jurisdiction over their claims was proper because 
they would otherwise be deprived of “meaningful judicial review”). 
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“increasing congressional and administration frustration.”62 Despite various 
responsive attempts to close off these avenues of judicial review, the next bona 
fide round of judicial review “Whac-a-Mole” would not take place until 1996 
when Congress overhauled the system once more.63 
B. Judicial Review in Immigration Proceedings After 1996 
In 1996, Congress passed two statutes that fundamentally altered—and 
further limited—judicial review of administrative immigration decisions.64 
The first piece of legislation was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which specifically eliminated judicial review 
for noncitizens convicted of certain criminal offenses.65 This substantial 
restriction of judicial review reflected “congressional dissatisfaction with the 
pace of criminal alien removals under existing laws.”66 A similar sentiment 
was evident in the second piece of legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which added 
§ 1252(b)(9), among other provisions.67 
IIRIRA “restructured judicial review in fundamental ways.”68 Most 
significantly, IIRIRA repealed the entirety of section 106, which had been in 
place since 1961, and replaced it with section 242 of the INA, now codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1252.69 The new law consolidated what were once separate 
exclusion and deportation proceedings into a singular “removal proceeding” 
and accordingly created a singular order of removal.70 
Under section 242, judicial review of these orders was subject to the Hobbs 
Act, which had previously applied only to deportation orders under section 
106.71 The Hobbs Act prohibits district court review of administrative 
decisions and instead funnels judicial review into the court of appeals through 
 
62 Id. at 1433. 
63 See id. at 1433-38 (tracing the history of judicial review between 1961 and 1996, noting that 
no major changes had taken place until 1996). 
64 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 396 (“[T]wo separate pieces of legislation significantly 
changed judicial review of immigration decisions.”). 
65 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (1996). 
66 See McConnell, supra note 39, at 83 n.2 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 2, (1996)) (explaining 
that a purpose of the bill was to “expedit[e] the removal of excludable and deportable aliens, especially 
criminal aliens”) (emphasis added). 
67 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1231, 1252) 
(repealing INA § 106 in IIRIRA § 306(b) and creating the new INA § 242). 
68 Motomura, supra note 27, at 397. 
69 Immigration and Nationality Act § 242 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). See also Benson, supra 
note 25, at 1442-43 (“[IIRIRA] also completely repealed the former statutory section governing 
judicial review of deportation and exclusion proceedings . . . .”). 
70 Motomura, supra note 27, at 397. 
71 Section 242(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)) provides: “Judicial review of a final order 
of removal . . . is governed only by [the Hobbs Act] . . . .” 
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a petition for review process.72 Therefore, under the new judicial review 
regime, which is still in place today, noncitizens are prohibited from 
challenging their removal orders in district court. Instead, under § 1252(a)(1), 
judicial review of final orders of removal can be obtained only through the 
filing of a petition for review with the appropriate court of appeals.73 With 
this change, Congress eliminated the few remaining statutorily authorized 
avenues to judicial review in district court.74 
C. Consolidation of Claims: The Addition and Intent of § 1252(b)(9) 
IIRIRA did not only deprive district courts of jurisdiction over challenges 
to final removal orders. With the addition of § 1252(b)(9), IIRIRA also 
removed district court jurisdiction over many claims that even relate to 
removal and the removal process. Subsection 1252(b)(9) provides: 
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or 
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States . . . shall be 
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.75 
At bottom, the provision is meant to consolidate for review—or “zip”76—all 
precedent claims “arising from” removal proceedings into a subsequent petition 
for review with a court of appeals, alongside a noncitizen’s challenge to her final 
removal order.77 With the addition of § 1252(b)(9), as one court put it, Congress 
sought to prevent “piecemeal litigation” by limiting all noncitizens “to one bite 
of the apple with regard to challenging an order of removal.”78  
 
72 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351. 
73 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Congress later clarified in the REAL ID Act of 2005, which added 
section 242(a)(5) to the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)), that 
the petition for review process is “exclusive and not subject to circumvention.” See O.A. v. Trump, 
404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 128 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that “a petition for review filed with an appropriate 
court of appeals” is “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal”). 
74 As noted supra, under section 106(b), noncitizens could challenge final orders of exclusion in 
district court through a petition for habeas, and under section 106(a)(9), noncitizens could challenge 
custody pursuant to final orders of deportation in district court through a petition for habeas. See 
supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
75 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); see also supra note 19 (discussing the REAL ID Act’s amendment 
to § 1252(b)(9)). 
76 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) 
(describing § 1252(b)(9) as an “unmistakable zipper clause”) (internal quotations omitted). 
77 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020) (“Congress intended the zipper clause 
to ‘consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.’”). 
78 Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005). Though the Court was explaining 
the intent of the REAL ID Act, the logic applies with equal force to the original intent of 
§ 1252(b)(9). See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1269 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The 
purpose of these claim-channeling provisions is to limit all [noncitizens] to one bite of the apple 
with regard to challenging an order of removal.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
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The legislative history of the REAL ID Act of 2005—which amended 
§ 1252(b)(9) by adding a clause to explicitly state that the provision applied 
to habeas claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241—similarly noted that § 1252(b)(9) 
“made clear that review of a final removal order [through a petition for review 
with a court of appeals] is the only mechanism for reviewing any issue raised 
in a removal proceeding.”79 In sum, § 1252(b)(9) aims to funnel any claims 
stemming from removal proceedings away from federal district court and into 
an eventual petition for review with a court of appeals. 
In an article critical of IIRIRA’s judicial review scheme, Professor Benson 
observes that § 1252(b)(9) was apparently intended to overturn Supreme 
Court decisions like Cheng and McNary, which allowed litigants to find their 
way into district court despite the “sole and exclusive” review procedures of 
the now-repealed section 106.80 Relative to section 106, which consolidated 
only challenges to “final orders,” § 1252(b)(9) appears to have a broader scope. 
On its face, § 1252(b)(9) aims to “gather all [] permissible claims and channel 
them into review of the final order of [removal]” with a court of appeals.81 
Ostensibly, even claims that were previously collateral to “final orders” under 
section 106—like those at issue in Cheng—might be consolidated under a 
broad reading of § 1252(b)(9).82  
D. The Consequence of Consolidation: The Administrative Process 
Importantly, § 1252(b)(9) does not eliminate access to judicial review 
altogether.83 Where applicable, the provision only requires noncitizens to 
consolidate their claims for eventual judicial review in a petition for review with 
 
79 H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 173 (2005). The House Report further explained that the 
combination of § 1252(a)(1)—the provision implementing the Hobbs Act—and § 1252(b)(9) were 
“intended to preclude all district court review of any issue raised in a removal proceeding.” Id.; see 
also supra note 19 (explaining the REAL ID Act’s effect on § 1252(b)(9)). 
80 Benson, supra note 25, at 1456-57. 
81 Id. at 1456 (emphasis added). Notably, some, including the three dissenting justices in 
Jennings, have construed § 1252(b)(9) in a similar way courts did section 106: that it applies only to 
challenges to “final orders.” For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra note 198. 
82 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 417 (“[T]he government decision at issue in Cheng—denial 
of a stay of deportation after a deportation order—may be within the new timing consolidation 
provision in § 1252(b)(9).”). 
83 See id. at 416-17 (explaining that § 1252(b)(9) consolidated the claims that must be brought 
in a petition for review in front of a court of appeals); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs 
Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that § 1252(b)(9) “is a judicial channeling provision, not 
a claim-barring one”). 
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a court of appeals.84 Therefore, when claims implicate § 1252(b)(9), the question 
is not if they can be reviewed by a federal court but where, when, and how.85 
If the claims fall within § 1252(b)(9)’s scope, they must be consolidated into a 
petition for review before a court of appeals only after exhausting administrative 
remedies, which in the immigration context is called “removal proceedings.” If, 
on the other hand, claims fall outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9), they can be 
reviewed directly and more immediately by a federal district court.86 Although 
judicial review exists in either scenario, having claims consolidated into a petition 
for review has several critical drawbacks for noncitizens. 
First, noncitizens may be forced to wait for a staggering period of time—
months or years, often while in detention87—before their removal proceedings 
conclude and they can file a petition for review with a court of appeals.88 
Removal proceedings unfold in two stages.89 In the first, an immigration 
judge determines whether to sustain the charges contained in the 
government’s official charging documents that present the provisions of the 
 
84 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (concluding that the 
purpose of § 1252(b)(9) is to “consolidate ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one 
action in the court of appeals,” and therefore it is not meant to completely eliminate or bar claims). 
85 See Narasimhan, supra note 28, at 1449 (“[§ 1252(b)(9)] consolidate[s] questions for judicial 
review both as a matter of time and forum.”); see also J. E. F.M. ex rel. Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 
1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting with respect to § 1252(b)(9) 
that “[t]he issue is only how and where [the claims] may be raised”). 
86 See, e.g., S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-760, 2020 WL 3265533, 
at *16-18 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020) (finding that claims challenging conditions of confinement in 
immigration detention fell outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9), thereby permitting review in district 
court). To be clear, there are other jurisdiction-limiting provisions in the INA, mainly in § 1252. 
Even if a claim overcomes § 1252(b)(9), there may be other barriers to district court jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (restricting district court jurisdiction over challenges to an agency’s 
discretionary actions or decisions); Benson, supra note 25, at 1445-55 (describing the disfavored 
litigants and disfavored claims under § 1252). 
87 See TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 22 (finding that the average wait for an immigration hearing 
is well over a year, though noting that it can be shorter for detained noncitizens). 
88 The INA provides for two different administrative processes. One is the “expedited 
removal” process, which, as its name suggests, focuses on rapidly removing noncitizens near the 
border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (explaining the conditions in which a noncitizen arrives and is subject to 
expedited removal proceedings); see also 84 Fed. Reg. 35410 (July 23, 2019) (explaining that the 
Department of Homeland Security “may remove, without a hearing before an immigration judge, 
certain aliens arriving in the United States . . . who are inadmissible under [certain subsections of 
the INA]”). The other are “regular removal proceedings.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (requiring that “[a]n 
immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an 
alien” and explaining requirements for such proceedings). Since the INA eliminates all avenues of 
judicial review for those in expedited removal, this Comment only discusses regular removal 
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (eliminating judicial review in expedited removal 
proceedings). These paragraphs offer a highly abbreviated summary of removal proceedings. For a 
more in-depth explanation of the removal process, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in 
Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 957-58 (2015). 
89 Eagly, supra note 88, at 957-58 (explaining the two stages). 
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INA the noncitizen allegedly violated.90 If the immigration judge sustains the 
charges, that judge will issue a removal order, unless the noncitizen applies 
for relief, such as asylum or voluntary departure, in which case she moves to 
the second stage of removal proceedings.91 In the second stage, the 
immigration judge adjudicates the application for relief.92 If the judge rejects 
either or both applications, the noncitizen is issued a removal order.93 
Regardless of when a removal order is issued—the first stage or the second 
stage—it does not automatically become “final.” A removal order becomes 
final after the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms the order on appeal or 
upon the expiration of the period during which the noncitizen is permitted 
to seek review of the order with the Board of Immigration Appeals.94 Only 
then, after the removal order becomes final, can a noncitizen finally file a 
petition for review before a court of appeals.95 
To underscore how painstakingly long this process can be, consider the 
following example of a group of noncitizen asylum-seekers detained in an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in the San Francisco 
area.96 Although the noncitizens had retained counsel to represent them in 
removal proceedings, a rarity for detained immigrants,97 ICE transferred 
them to faraway facilities outside California, making it nearly impossible for 
 
90 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14 (2020) (defining “[c]harging document” as “the written 
instrument which initiates a proceeding before an Immigration Judge” and explaining that 
“proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is fled with the 
Immigration Court by the Service”). 
91 Eagly, supra note 88, at 957-58. Voluntary departure is an immigration benefit that allows a 
noncitizen to avoid the harsh penalties associated with receiving a formal removal order. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.26 (2020). Professor Eagly notes that voluntary departure might be better categorized as an 
immigration “benefit” rather than as an actual form of “relief ” because it still results in departure 
from the United States. Eagly, supra note 88, at 938 n.23. 
92 Eagly, supra note 88, at 957-58. 
93 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration 
judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States.”). 
94 Id. In addition to this statutory provision, federal regulations permit an order of removal 
issued by an immigration judge to become final in several other circumstances. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1241.1(a) (2020) (explaining that a removal order shall become final upon dismissal of an appeal by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals); § 1241.1(b) (upon waiver of appeal by noncitizen); § 1241.1(d) 
(upon the date of a decision ordering removal if case is certified to the Attorney General or Board 
of Immigration Appeals); § 1241.1(e) (explaining removal in abstentia, in which a removal order 
becomes final immediately if “an immigration judge orders an alien removed in the alien’s absence”). 
95 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (requiring removal order to be final before noncitizen can seek 
judicial review through a petition for review with a court of appeals). 
96 The following facts are based on Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1044-45 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018). It is unclear from the facts provided whether the noncitizens were indeed seeking asylum, 
but the court noted that many of them already had their first immigration hearing, suggesting they 
were seeking some form of relief from removal. Id. at 1044. 
97 See Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (finding that only fourteen percent of detained immigrants secure representation). 
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their lawyers to continue representing them effectively.98 In response, the 
noncitizens brought due process claims under the Fifth Amendment to a 
federal district court, arguing that their relocation violated their 
constitutional right to counsel.99 The court, however, held that the claims fell 
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9)—if the noncitizens wanted to bring these 
constitutional claims, they would have to do so in a petition for review with 
a court of appeals only after completing removal proceedings without the 
benefit of counsel.100 
Once a district court denies review under § 1252(b)(9), the outlook is 
grim. It could be years before removal proceedings conclude and the petition 
for review process becomes available noncitizens seeking judicial review. At 
the time of writing, the average wait for any hearing before an immigration 
judge is over 800 days.101 If a noncitizen wants to seek asylum or other relief 
in the second stage of removal proceedings, like the detained noncitizens 
described above, the wait will be even longer.102 Although detained 
immigrants generally face shorter delays, the wait in detention is still a matter 
of months, not days.103 
Assuming an immigration judge denies relief,104 the noncitizens can 
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals—but that will add another 
several months, if not years, to their path to judicial review. In a 2012 report, 
the U.S. Department of Justice found that the Board of Immigration Appeals 
took about three months to complete appeals involving detained noncitizens 
and completed those involving non-detained noncitizens in around sixteen 
months, “with some cases taking more than five years to complete.”105 
 
98 Alvarez, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1045. 
99 Id. 
100 This was the holding of Alvarez, which read § 1252(b)(9) broadly to encompass the right-to-
counsel claims. 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1049. See generally KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV. R43613 
ALIENS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 6, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43613.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MRG-NJMA] (explaining that 
although noncitizens do not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the government’s expense, 
they generally have a Fifth Amendment right to counsel at their own expense in removal proceedings). 
101 See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 8, 2018), 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog [https://perma.cc/S658-RCH7]; see also TRAC 
IMMIGR., supra note 22 (explaining that sixty-one percent of cases in the backlog are waiting for their 
first hearing before an immigration judge, which represents the “first stage” of removal proceedings). 
102 See TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 22 (explaining that the delay to schedule “individual merits 
hearing[s],” the second stage of removal proceedings, will be “a great deal longer” than the average wait times). 
103 See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 101 (noting that wait times for detained 
immigrants can be as little as a month or two). 
104 This is a safe assumption because detained noncitizens who are not represented are exceedingly 
unlikely to obtain relief. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 97, at 50 (finding that only two percent of 
unrepresented, detained noncitizens obtained relief in removal proceedings between 2007-2012). 
105 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., I-2013-001, MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION CASES & APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE 
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Although the data are now outdated, the backlog at the Board of Immigration 
Appeals has only gotten worse. In 2012, when the report was released, there 
were around 25,000 appeals pending.106 In 2020, there were nearly 91,000 
appeals pending before the Board.107 Therefore, if § 1252(b)(9) applies to a 
noncitizen’s claims, it will likely be months or years before the noncitizens 
can administratively exhaust their claims and bring them through a petition 
for review with a court of appeals. In the interim, noncitizens may be 
languishing in detention,108 stranded in dangerous border towns in Mexico,109 
or closely monitored by ICE.110 
The second drawback of having claims consolidated by § 1252(b)(9) is that 
the record for review is limited. When a case reaches the court of appeals 
through the petition for review process, the court “shall decide the petition 
only on the administrative record on which the removal order is based.”111 But 
the record developed during the administrative process—the multiple phases 
of removal proceedings described above—may not adequately address the 
claims that a noncitizen seeks to raise.112 
Consider, for example, the case of unrepresented noncitizen minors who 
brought claims into federal district court arguing that they have a 
constitutional due process right to government-appointed counsel.113 The 
district court held—and the circuit court affirmed on appeal—that 
§ 1252(b)(9) applied to the minors’ claims, thus forcing them to raise their 
 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW iii (2012), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/e1301.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ANK-BTRE]. 
106 EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ADJUDICATION STATISTICS 
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248506/download [https://perma.cc/R228-BFSC]. 
107 Id. 
108 See AM. C.L. UNION, HUM. RTS. WATCH & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., JUSTICE-
FREE ZONES: U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 5 (2020) 
(outlining growth of immigration detention during the Trump administration) 
109 See Jordan, supra note 4 (explaining squalid conditions on the U.S.-Mexican border for 
those migrants subject to MPP). 
110 See Fact Sheet: Electronic Monitoring Devices as Alternatives to Detention, NAT’L IMMIGR. 
FORUM (Feb. 22, 2019) https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-electronic-monitoring-
devices-as-alternatives-to-detention [https://perma.cc/URC3-CLCL] (highlighting the various 
invasive means ICE uses to monitor non-detained noncitizens during removal proceedings). 
111 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 
112 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999) 
(“Since neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to hear 
such claims . . . a challenge to a final order of deportation based upon such a claim would arrive in 
the court of appeals without the factual development necessary for decision.”). This concern was 
also articulated by the five Ninth Circuit judges that dissented to the decision to deny rehearing and 
rehearing en banc of J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1034 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016). See J. E. F.M. ex rel. 
Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting that 
immigration judges have little reason to develop an adequate record to address a potential future 
right-to-counsel claim). 
113 These facts are based off J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1029-31. 
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claims individually in a court of appeals through a petition for review after 
their removal proceedings concluded.114  
If the minors eventually came before a court of appeals through a petition 
for review, the record to bolster their constitutional claims would be sparse at 
best. That is because throughout removal proceedings, immigration judges and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals are uniquely concerned with the merits of an 
individual’s case—whether she is eligible for asylum or another form of relief.115 
Not only do these administrative adjudicators have “no reason to develop an 
adequate record” related to a noncitizen’s constitutional right-to-counsel claims—
or any other similar claim—but doing so may also exceed their authority.116 The 
record that develops throughout removal proceedings, therefore, is unlikely to 
cover the types of claims that are susceptible to the reach of § 1252(b)(9).117 In 
these circumstances, a reviewing court of appeals is thus restricted to using an 
inadequate record to adjudicate often significant constitutional issues. 
The third disadvantage of having claims swallowed by § 1252(b)(9) 
concerns representation. Permitting noncitizens to access district courts 
allows them to bring class action suits, which, in turn, allows public interest 
organizations to provide representation to a greater number of people than 
they would be able to assist on an individual basis through removal 
proceedings.118 If claims fall outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9) and can proceed 
in district court, the noncitizen may be able sue on behalf of a class, 
permitting the court to review issues that arise for many other noncitizens 
during administrative adjudication.119 This is not true of removal proceedings, 
which can only address claims of individual noncitizens, not classes.120 Class 
actions are a crucial tool, not only because any relief granted will be widely 
 
114 Id. at 1031-35. 
115 See J. E. F.M. 908 F.3d at 1163 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (explaining that immigration judges and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals are focused solely on the merits of an individual immigration case). 
116 Id. 
117 That was precisely the Supreme Court’s concern in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, where 
an inadequate record in the administrative process was central to finding that precluding district 
court jurisdiction would deprive noncitizens of “meaningful judicial review.” 498 U.S. at 496. 
118 See J. E. F.M., 908 F.3d at 1158 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (explaining that permitting district 
court review would allow for the “representation of the class . . . by public interest organizations that 
lack the capacity to represent each class member individually”). 
119 See 8 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. 
WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 112.02 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.) (discussing 
necessary steps for bringing class action lawsuit in the immigration context). It is worth noting that 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) may limit certain class actions in the immigration context. See Jill E. Family, 
Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief, 53 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 11, 13 (2005) (observing that 8 U.S.C § 1252(f)(1) may limit the ability of federal courts 
to grant class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases). 
120 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (explaining that individual removal proceedings are the “sole and 
exclusive procedure” for determining admissibility); id. § 1229a(a)(1) (“An immigration judge shall 
conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportation of an alien.”) (emphasis added). 
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enjoyed, but also because public interest organizations may lack the capacity 
to represent each class member individually. Therefore, if claims can be heard 
in district court, these organizations can consolidate their efforts into class 
actions and distribute their representation more broadly. 
Whether a noncitizen can access district court has significant, if not grave, 
consequences. Had the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to 
dismiss Efrain and Mia’s case, they would have been sent back to Mexico—
with no guarantee of safety or survival. But their case is just one of a number 
of situations in which § 1252(b)(9) may be implicated. 
E. The Contexts Where § 1252(b)(9) May Arise 
Claims that implicate § 1252(b)(9) are most often brought to federal 
district court before and during removal proceedings and challenge a wide 
range of allegedly unlawful action. As the following scenarios illustrate, 
determining whether claims raise a question “arising from any action taken 
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” is anything 
but straightforward.121 
Noncitizens often seek to bring claims to district court that arise even 
before the initiation of removal proceedings. For example, they have sought to 
challenge the way in which ICE stopped, searched, and detained them, which 
includes claims challenging large, indiscriminate ICE raids and sweeps.122 
Likewise, noncitizens (and organizational plaintiffs) have sought to challenge 
immigration policies such the rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA)123 and severe restrictions placed on access to asylum.124 
Although not clearly brought “before” removal proceedings, these are claims 
brought by noncitizens who were never in removal proceedings or are seeking 
to apply for asylum, which requires the initiation of removal proceedings.125 
 
121 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 
122 See Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2018) 
(challenging allegedly illegal ICE stops and searches), rev’d on other grounds by Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 
922 F.3d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 2019); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 885 (N.D. 
Ill. 2020) (challenging ICE’s allegedly race-based traffic stops and large-scale, indiscriminate 
sweeps); Nak Kim Chhoeun v. Marin, No. 17-01898, 2018 WL 1941756, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2018) 
(challenging ICE’s decision to round up and detain approximately 100 Cambodian nationals). 
123 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020). 
124 See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1259 (9th Cir. 2020) (challenging 
the November 2018 rule and proclamation that, together, “strip[] asylum eligibility from every migrant 
who crosses into the United States between designated ports of entry”); O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 
3d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2019) (presenting a similar challenge to the one brought in E. Bay Sanctuary 
Covenant); Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 423 F. Supp. 3d 848, 857 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (challenging 
the “asylum ban,” which required most non-Mexican nationals to seek asylum in Mexico). 
125 This is only true of defensive asylum applications. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
OBTAINING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/
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Likewise, noncitizens often seek to bring claims implicating § 1252(b)(9) 
to federal district court during removal proceedings. For example, noncitizens 
have sought to challenge their transfer to faraway detention facilities (or 
foreign countries) in the midst of their removal proceedings because it would 
violate their right to counsel;126 they have brought challenges to the use of 
videoconference technology during their removal proceedings;127 and they 
have attempted to challenge their prolonged detention pending completion 
of removal proceedings.128 
Less often, claims squarely implicating § 1252(b)(9) are brought after 
removal proceedings have concluded and a removal order has already become 
final. At that point, noncitizens may be able to bring any precedent claims to 
a court of appeals in a petition for review, alongside their challenge to a final 
removal order, because that process has become available to them.129 But it 
may also be the case that a neighboring provision, § 1252(a)(5), serves an 
identical channeling function for claims brought to district court after a 
 
humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/4Z2S-
LJ6U] (explaining the differences between affirmative and defensive asylum). 
126 See Arroyo v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *3-4 (C.D. 
Cal. June 20, 2019) (discussing a right-to-counsel claim noncitizen plaintiff brought after being 
transferred to detention facilitates outside a particular ICE field office’s “Area of Responsibility”); 
Avilez v. Barr, No. 19-08296, 2020 WL 570987, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2020) (discussing a right-to-
counsel claim noncitizen plaintiff brought after being transferred from a detention facility in 
California to one in Texas); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(discussing a right-to-counsel claim noncitizen plaintiff brought after being transferred from 
detention facility in California to others in Washington and Colorado). Similar claims have also 
been brought by plaintiffs who have been or will be removed from the country. See, e.g., Anaya 
Murcia v. Godfrey, No. 19-587, 2019 WL 5597883, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2019) (discussing the 
right-to-counsel claim noncitizen plaintiff brought after ICE removed him to El Salvador before his 
case was remanded to an immigration court for further proceedings), appeal docketed, No. 19-35-35913 
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2019); Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 3d 477, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 
2019) (discussing right-to-counsel claim that noncitizen plaintiff raised in anticipation of their return 
to Mexico during the pendency of their removal proceedings). 
127 See P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 21, 2019) (discussing a noncitizen plaintiff ’s claim that ICE’s policy regarding video 
teleconferencing violates plaintiff ’s due process rights); Flores Valle v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs 
Enf ’t, No. 19-2254, 2019 WL 7756069, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2019) (discussing a noncitizen 
plaintiff ’s claim that exclusive use of video teleconference technology in immigration removal 
proceedings violates plaintiff ’s constitutional and statutory rights). 
128 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 838 (2018) (addressing challenge to prolonged 
detention during removal proceedings). 
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (“Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its 
entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”). 
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removal order has become final.130 Indeed, many courts have stated as much131 
and have deployed § 1252(a)(5) without § 1252(b)(9) in such cases.132 
Some courts have contended, however, that the two provisions necessarily 
work in tandem to channel claims into a single petition for review.133 In fact, 
many courts examining claims brought after a removal order has become final 
have simultaneously used § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) to evaluate a noncitizen’s 
claims. This includes challenges to agency decisions to dismiss adjustment of 
status applications for lack of jurisdiction,134 challenges to deficient Notices To 
Appear (NTAs), which resulted in removal in abstentia,135 and cases in which 
 
130 Added by the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including [28 
U.S.C. § 2241], or any other habeas corpus provision . . . a petition for review filed 
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole 
and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under 
any provision of this chapter . . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), amended by REAL ID Act of 2005, § 106(a)(1)(B). Through this provision, 
Congress made clear that the petition for review process outlined in § 1252(a)(1) is the “sole and 
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.” Id. (emphasis added). 
131 See Rivas Rosales v. Barr, No. 20-008888, 2020 WL 1505682, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020) 
(“[B]ecause there had not been an order of removal in the [present case], section 1252(a)(5), which 
pertains to review of removal orders, does not govern the analysis here.”), appeal filed No. 20-15813 
(9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2020); E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 
2020) (explaining that § 1252(a)(5) specifically bars challenges to removal orders); J.E. F.M. ex rel. 
Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“§ 1252(a)(5) . . . 
applies only when there is an order of removal, not when none has been entered.”). 
132 See, e.g., Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that if a 
noncitizen “challenges the procedure and substance of an agency determination that is ‘inextricably 
linked’ to the order of removal, it is prohibited by section 1252(a)(5)”) (emphasis added); Delgado v. 
Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the substance of the relief ” the noncitizen 
is seeking will determine if claims challenge an order of removal and are channeled by § 1252(a)(5)). 
133 According to one court, “§ 1252(a)(5) is central to Section 1252(b)(9)’s scope.” Cancino-
Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2018). Another explained that § 1252(a)(5) 
“prescribes the vehicle for judicial review” and § 1252(b)(9) establishes the types claims that should 
be placed into that vehicle. J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016). 
134 See, e.g., Patel v. Wolf, 427 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164-65 (D. Mass.) (“[P]laintiffs request that the 
Court invalidate the Attorney General regulations depriving USCIS of jurisdiction and order 
defendants to adjudicate plaintiffs’ applications.”); Santa Maria v. McAleenan, No. 18-3996, 2019 WL 
2120725, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] sued the heads of the Department of Homeland 
Security and of Citizenship and Immigration Services, arguing that the decision to close her application 
for lack of jurisdiction was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law.”); Isaula v. Nielson, No. 18-2992, 
2019 WL 93307, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] argues that USCIS’s administrative closure 
of his I-485 application [for lack of jurisdiction] was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law[]’ . . . .”); Herbert L.R. v. Tritten, 421 F. Supp. 3d 688, 692 
(D. Minn. 2019) (“[Plaintiff] alleges that he qualifies as an ‘arriving alien’ based on his 2008 parole entry 
and that, as a result, USCIS retains jurisdiction to adjudicate his application.”). 
135 See e.g., Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project v. Barr, 409 F. Supp. 3d 221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(examining an objection to in absentia removal orders issued with allegedly deficient notice to the 
noncitizens subject to these orders); Rickey R. v. Sessions, No. 18-15613, 2018 WL 5962479, at *1 
(D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2018) (examining an objection to an allegedly deficient notice to appear, and 
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noncitizens with existing orders of removal attempt to adjust their status or 
reopen their removal proceedings but are arrested, detained, or even removed 
in the process.136 But even when used together in these post-final-removal-order 
cases, § 1252(a)(5) may be doing more of the work than § 1252(b)(9). 
That is to say, the precise division of labor between the two provisions is 
imprecise and outlining its contours is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
What is clear, though, is that § 1252(b)(9) plays a uniquely important role in 
cases brought prior to a removal order becoming final, which is the primary 
focus of this Comment. And in those cases, a federal district court must 
determine whether its jurisdiction is foreclosed by § 1252(b)(9), an inquiry 
that necessarily centers on the provision’s text. 
F. Textual Considerations When Interpreting § 1252(b)(9) 
Courts have grappled with three major textual issues when applying 
§ 1252(b)(9). 
First, at issue has been the extent to which the introductory clause of 
§ 1252(b) modifies or limits the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(b) 
provides: “With respect to review of an order of removal under subsection 
(a)(1), the following requirements apply.”137 Many courts have interpreted this 
clause to impose serious limitations on the range of claims § 1252(b)(9) 
encompasses.138 But today, especially in light of Jennings, few courts, if any, 
still maintain that view.139 
Second, and most fervently contested in today’s § 1252(b)(9) 
jurisprudence, is how broadly the phrase “arising from” should be read. 
Perhaps the broadest reading proposed is that any legal claim that would not 
have arisen “but for” some removal action should fall within the reach of the 
 
ultimately dismissing for lack of jurisdiction); Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-00824, 2019 WL 
2774211, at *1 (D. Col. July 2, 2019) (examining an objection to a removal order issued after the 
Department of Homeland security issued a notice to appear without a time or date of the appearance). 
136 See, e.g., Mamadjonova v. Barr, No. 19-01317, 2019 WL 6174678, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 
2019) (no jurisdiction); Ketsoyan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 19-01198, 2019 WL 4261881, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. July 2, 2019) (no jurisdiction); Sied v. Nielsen, No. 17-06785, 2018 WL 1142202, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 2, 2018) (jurisdiction); De Jesus Martinez v. Nielsen, 341 F. Supp. 3d 400, 407-08 (D.N.J. 2018) 
(jurisdiction); You, Xiu Qing v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (jurisdiction); 
Wanrong Lin v. Nielsen, 377 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D. Md. 2019) (jurisdiction); Chaudhry v. Barr, 
No. 19-0682, 2019 WL 3713762, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2019) (jurisdiction); Chhoeun v. Marin, 
306 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1158-59 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (jurisdiction); M’Bagoyi v. Barr, 423 F. Supp. 3d 99, 
105-06 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (jurisdiction); Calderon v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 944, 955-56 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (jurisdiction); Jimenez v. Nielsen, 334 F. Supp. 3d 370, 381-85 (D. Mass. 2018) (jurisdiction). 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (emphasis added). Subsection 1252(a)(1) sets forth that judicial review of a 
final order of removal is exclusively governed by the petition for review process. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
138 See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text (analyzing readings that place substantial 
weight on the prefatory clause of § 1252(b)). 
139 See infra Part II (explaining how this view has fallen out of favor). 
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provision and therefore must be consolidated into a petition for review.140 
Another broad reading of “arising from” was adopted by the First and Ninth 
Circuits prior to Jennings.141 Although the Jennings plurality failed to provide 
a clear and comprehensive definition of the phrase, it explicitly rejected the 
“but for” interpretation142 and implicitly, as this Comment contends, rejected 
that broad interpretation embraced in the First and Ninth Circuits.143 
Third, the contours of an “action taken or proceeding brought to remove 
an alien from the United States”144 has been questioned. Overall, this clause 
has received less attention than “arising from,” but it has still been construed 
in divergent ways. For instance, Justice Thomas argued in Jennings that 
detention is an “action taken to remove an alien from the United States,”145 
which the plurality met with substantial skepticism.146 
As Professor Benson predicted in her 1997 article, “litigants are likely to 
find a variety of ways to try to evade the strictures” of § 1252(b)(9).147 Although 
it may be better phrased as litigants trying to bring claims that legitimately fall 
outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9), her prediction was prescient—noncitizens 
have consistently sought to bring removal-related claims directly to federal 
district court despite the channeling provision of § 1252(b)(9).148 Part II will 
 
140 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 854 (2018) (Thomas, J., Concurring) (“Detaining an 
alien falls within [‘arising from’]—indeed, this Court has described detention during removal 
proceedings as an ‘aspect of the deportation process.’”) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 
141 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (“By its terms, 
the provision aims to consolidate ‘all questions of law and fact’ that ‘arise from’ either an ‘action’ or 
a ‘proceeding’ brought in connection with the removal of an alien.”); J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 
1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the Aguilar decision and holding that a noncitizen’s right 
to counsel claim is “‘inextricably intertwined with’” the removal process). 
142 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that if “the 
applicability of § 1252(b)(9) turns on whether the legal questions that we must decide ‘aris[e] from’ 
the actions taken to remove these aliens” then “[i]t may be argued that . . . if those actions had never 
been taken, the aliens would not be in custody at all. But this expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) 
would lead to staggering results”). 
143 See infra Part III (arguing that Jennings narrowed interpretations advanced in Aguilar and 
J.E. F.M.). 
144 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 
145 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 855 (Thomas, J., Concurring) (“[D]etention is an ‘action taken . . . to 
remove’ an alien.”). 
146 Id. at 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that it would be illogical to view 
detention as an action taken “to remove an alien”). Several district courts have similarly interpreted 
this clause of § 1252(b)(9). See, e.g., O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 132 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The 
challenged Rule is not an ‘action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States,’ and was not 
promulgated as part of a removal ‘proceeding.’”); Hernandez Culajay v. McAleenan, 396 F. Supp. 
3d 477, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“The immigration officer’s decision to place Plaintiffs in line for regular 
proceedings, rather than expedited proceedings . . . is an ‘action taken . . . to remove an alien.’”). 
147 Benson, supra note 25, at 1458. 
148 See Appendix, infra (highlighting the many cases noncitizens have brought that are removal-
related yet may not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9)). 
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begin to distinguish situations where § 1252(b)(9) operates to preclude litigants’ 
claims from district court and those where it does not. 
II. THE LONG-ROAD TO JENNINGS: A POST-ST. CYR CIRCUIT SPLIT 
“The maze of immigration statutes and amendments is notoriously 
complicated and has been described as ‘second only to the Internal Revenue 
Code in complexity.’”149 That may help explain why § 1252(b)(9) 
jurisprudence has developed in the confusing and piecemeal way it has. The 
Supreme Court directly addressed the scope of § 1252(b)(9) for the first time 
in St. Cyr, where it offered an ambiguous but narrow interpretation of the 
provision, emphasizing the prefatory clause contained in § 1252(b).150 In the 
ensuing years, lower courts diverged on how to apply § 1252(b)(9) in light of 
St. Cyr, but the prevailing interpretation became an extremely broad 
construction of the phrase “arising from,” first offered by the First Circuit 
and later adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Against this backdrop, almost two 
decades after St. Cyr, the Supreme Court revisited § 1252(b)(9), resulting in 
a sharply divided decision that failed to offer a comprehensive interpretation 
of the provision, leaving lower courts to fill in the gaps.151 
This Part summarizes the first two cases in which the Supreme Court 
tackled § 1252(b)(9), focusing primarily on the second case, St. Cyr, where it 
did so directly. Then, it turns to the lower courts’ evolving understanding of 
the provision, focusing primarily on the First and Ninth Circuits’ broad 
interpretation of “arising from.” Finally, it summarizes Jennings and offers 
some brief observations, prior to beginning a more comprehensive analysis of 
the case in Part III. 
A. The First Attempt: Reno v. AADC 
In 1999, three years after the passage of IIRIRA, the Supreme Court was 
tasked with interpreting the jurisdiction-limiting statute § 1252.152 Reno v. 
AADC involved eight noncitizens affiliated with the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine who alleged that the government was selectively 
 
149 Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
150 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001). 
151 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar jurisdiction); id. at 853-59 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) barred jurisdiction); id. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that 
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar jurisdiction but on different grounds than those the plurality advanced). 
152 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999) 
(introducing the Court’s discussion of § 1252). 
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enforcing immigration laws against them for political activity protected under 
the First Amendment.153 
At the time the noncitizens in AADC brought their claims to district 
court, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) was the only jurisdiction-limiting provision in the 
newly enacted IIRIRA that had been phased in.154 Section 1252(g) provides: 
“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf 
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against 
any alien under this chapter.”155 
The government argued that § 1252(g) is “a channeling provision, 
requiring aliens to bring all deportation-related claims in the context of a 
petition for review of a final order of deportation filed in the court of 
appeals”156 and thus deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the 
noncitizens’ selective-enforcement claim.157 
The Court agreed with the government that § 1252(g) barred district court 
jurisdiction over the selective-enforcement claim, but it read the provision 
“much more narrowly.”158 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained 
that § 1252(g) limited judicial review with respect to only “three discrete 
actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to 
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”159 
 
153 Id. at 474 (“Respondents amended their complaint to include an allegation that the INS 
was selectively enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth 
Amendment rights.”). 
154 Id. at 477 (explaining that § 1252(g) was the only provision that applied retroactively under IIRIRA). 
155 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Subsection (g) is frequently implicated in cases where § 1252(b)(9) 
presents potential jurisdictional barriers. In Nava v. Department of Homeland Security, for example, the 
government argued that § 1252(g) applied because Plaintiffs “challenge[d] aspects of ICE’s decision 
to arrest them in order to commence removal proceedings against them.” 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 895 
(N.D. Ill. 2020). That case involved a challenge to ICE’s “indiscriminate, large-scale immigration 
sweeps.” Id. at 885. Because it arguably involved both the Attorney General’s decision to “commence 
proceedings” as well as a claim “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an 
alien,” both § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9) were at issue. Id. at 894-95. The district court held that neither 
subsection applied and that it properly retained jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 895. Though a 
discussion of § 1252(g) is beyond the scope of this Comment, it has been the subject of recent scholarly 
attention. See, e.g., Matthew Miyamoto, Comment, Whether 8 USC § 1252(g) Precludes the Exercise of 
Federal Jurisdiction Over Claims Brought by Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655, 
1655 (2019) (arguing that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly); Kimberly P. Will, Comment, The 
Limits of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g): When Do Courts Have Jurisdiction to Entertain An Alien’s Claim for Damages 
Against the Government?, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 534 (2018) (contending that §1252(g) only applies 
in situations where the government exercises discretionary authority). 
156 AADC, 525 U.S. at 478. 
157 Id. at 471 (“The Attorney General filed motions in both the District Court and the Ninth 
Circuit, arguing that § 1252(g) deprived them of jurisdiction over respondents’ selective-
enforcement claim.”). 
158 See Motomura, supra note 27, at 403 (explaining how the Court’s decision in AADC 
narrowed the scope of § 1252(g)’s channeling function). 
159 AADC, 525 U.S. at 482 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). 
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The Court continued, explaining that § 1252(g) “performs the function of 
categorically excluding from non-final-order judicial review . . . certain 
specified decision and actions of the INS”160—specifically, matters of 
prosecutorial discretion.161 It concluded that the selective-prosecution claim 
“falls squarely within” the scope of § 1252(g) and thus was dismissed.162 
Given its focus on § 1252(g), the Court did not directly examine the scope 
of § 1252(b)(9), but it did characterize the provision as an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ 
clause.”163 What exactly is “zipped” into the clause, however, did not become 
clearer until the Supreme Court squarely addressed the provision in St. Cyr. 
B. The Second Attempt: INS v. St. Cyr 
Two years later, the Court directly confronted the scope of § 1252(b)(9) 
in St. Cyr.164 The respondent in St. Cyr was a lawful permanent resident who 
was issued a removal order after having pleaded guilty to a state drug charge, 
a removable offense.165 As a result of his criminal charge, the noncitizen 
respondent was ineligible for the petition for review process set forth in 
§ 1252(a)(1).166 So, because he was prohibited from filing a petition for review 
with a court of appeals, the noncitizen instead filed a petition for habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in federal district court, claiming he was 
eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportation, which had been available to 
him prior to the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA.167 
Among its various arguments, the government contended that 
§ 1252(b)(9) precluded habeas jurisdiction and instead required consolidation 
of such claims into a petition for review before a court of appeals—a process 
for which the “criminal alien” was ineligible.168 The Court rejected the 
government’s argument, holding that § 1252(b)(9) did not contain a 
sufficiently clear statement to repeal habeas jurisdiction under § 2241.169 In so 
 
160 Id. at 483. 
161 Motomura, supra note 27, at 404. 
162 AADC, 525 U.S. at 487. 
163 Id. at 483. In his analysis of AADC, Professor Neuman explains that the term “zipper clause” 
is derived from labor law, where it “refers to a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that 
prohibits further collective bargaining during the term of the agreement or, more generally, that 
limits the agreement of the parties to the four corners of the contract.” Neuman, supra note 26, at 
1984-85 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 89 (1999)). 
164 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001). 
165 Id. at 293. 
166 See id. at 313 (explaining that there was no other judicial forum where the noncitizen could 
have brought his claims). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (removing jurisdiction to review any final 
order of removal against certain “criminal aliens”). 
167 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
168 Id. at 313-14. 
169 See id. at 314 (concluding that AEDPA and IIRIRA do not repeal habeas jurisdiction, given 
“the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial 
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finding, the Court made an important observation about § 1252(b)(9) that 
caused deviations across the lower courts. 
The Court first reprised its characterization of § 1252(b)(9) as a “zipper 
clause”170 and stated that the provision’s “purpose is to consolidate judicial 
review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.”171 
The Court also noted, however, that the introductory clause in § 1252(b) 
limited the range of claims to which § 1252(b)(9) applies.172 It was largely this 
limitation that led the Court to hold that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar the district 
court’s jurisdiction over the noncitizen’s habeas petition.173 
The introductory clause of § 1252(b) states: “With respect to review of an 
order of removal under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the following 
requirements apply.”174 Since § 1252(b) modifies its sub-provisions, the Court 
reasoned that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only with respect to review of an order of 
removal under subsection (a)(1).”175 Put differently, the Court found that 
§ 1252(b)(9)’s channeling function applied only to review of final removal 
orders eligible for the petition for review process outlined in § 1252(a)(1). 
Because the “criminal alien” (and his removal order) was categorically 
ineligible for that petition for review process, however, § 1252(b)(9), “by its 
own terms,” had no bearing on his claims.176 To clarify, because Congress had 
categorically prohibited “criminal aliens” like the noncitizen here from 
seeking judicial review under the petition for review process set forth in 
§ 1252(a)(1), § 1252(b)(9) did not apply to the claims. Accordingly, 
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar the district court’s habeas jurisdiction.177 
On its face, the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Cyr appears to draw a 
categorical distinction: if a noncitizen is eligible for the petition for review 
process under § 1252(a)(1), then the restrictions of § 1252(b)(9) would apply. 
If, however, the noncitizen is ineligible for that process, § 1252(b)(9) and its 
prohibition of district court jurisdiction would not apply. 
 
consideration on habeas”). As a result, Congress, in the REAL ID Act, amended § 1252(b)(9) to 
make clear that habeas petitions could not be used to circumvent the provision’s strictures. See supra 
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the REAL ID Act’s effect on § 1252(b)(9)). 
170 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. 
(AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)). 
171 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
172 Id. 
173 See id. (“[§ 1252(b)(9)] does not bar habeas jurisdiction over removal orders not subject to 
judicial review under § 1252(a)(1) . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
174 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). 
175 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation omitted). Subsection 1252(a)(1) states judicial 
review of a final order of removal is governed only by the petition for review process set forth in the 
Hobbs Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
176 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313. 
177 Id. at 313-14. 
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But another legitimate interpretation of the Court’s opinion centers on a 
temporal limitation of § 1252(b)(9). Subsection 1252(b)(9) “applies only with 
respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),” and 
accordingly, the provision is inoperative unless and until such a removal order 
has been issued.178 Therefore, the applicability of § 1252(b)(9) does not turn 
on whether an individual may eventually be eligible for the petition for review 
process, but rather, whether or not they are eligible for that process at the 
specific moment in which they attempt to bring their claims in district court. 
Noncitizens whose orders of removal have not yet become final remain 
ineligible for the petition for review process in § 1252(a)(1). But the issuance 
of a final removal order triggers a noncitizen’s eligibility for the petition for 
review process, which in turn activates the channeling function of 
§ 1252(b)(9). In short, the reasoning of this interpretation goes, a noncitizen 
cannot possibly seek judicial review of a final order of removal under 
§ 1252(a)(1) if such an order does not yet exist. 
This distinction can be understood as temporal instead of categorical: 
§ 1252(b)(9) will not operate to channel claims into the petition for review 
process unless and until that process becomes available, when a noncitizen’s 
removal order has become final. In effect, this distinction seriously narrows 
the range of individuals whose claims would be channeled pursuant to 
§ 1252(b)(9). A noncitizen is free to bring their claims in federal district court 
up until the point at which her order of removal becomes final. 
Justice Scalia responded to this alternate temporal reading in his dissent. 
He argued that the majority, under this reading, put too much weight on the 
introductory clause of § 1252(b) and specifically on the word “apply.”179 In his 
view, § 1252(b)(9) would be rendered meaningless if it applied only after a 
final removal has been issued.180 What role would the provision play if it could 
not channel claims prior to the moment an order of removal becomes final?181 
Justice Scalia acknowledged the prefatory clause of § 1252(b) but read it 
differently. From his perspective, § 1252(b)(9) certainly “applies” to the 
review of a final order of removal under § 1252(a)(1), but it does so “in the 
broad sense.”182 It is not that § 1252(b)(9) applies only within review of a final 
order of removal under § 1252(a)(1) but that it operates “in connection with” 
such review.183 Accordingly, the provision requires that all claims “arising 
from” removal proceedings be consolidated and brought together in a petition 
 
178 Id. at 313 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. (“These provisions have no effect if they must apply . . . to review of an order of removal 
under subsection (a)(1).” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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for review, after the removal order becomes final.184 That, in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, is “application” enough.185 
Thus, the main inquiry in Justice Scalia’s approach is whether claims are 
“arising from” removal proceedings (or another “action taken” to remove a 
noncitizen).186 If they are “arising from,” the claims fall within the reach of 
§ 1252(b)(9) and must be brought after removal proceedings through a petition 
for review, alongside a review of a final order of removal under § 1252(a)(1). 
Importantly, and perhaps ironically, Justice Scalia’s interpretation is 
wholly compatible with the majority’s actual holding, just not the alternate 
reading to which he responded. The majority held that claims that will never 
be subject to judicial review under § 1252(a)(1) are also not subject to 
§ 1252(b)(9). Because the “criminal alien” in St. Cyr was categorically excluded 
from the petition for review process of § 1252(a)(1), there would never be any 
such process into which § 1252(b)(9) would require that he consolidate his 
claims—he would have no way to fold his claims into an eventual petition for 
review. The facts of St. Cyr thus differ from claims of a noncitizen who would 
eventually be eligible for the petition for review process under § 1252(a)(1) 
once his removal proceedings concluded. In this scenario, both the majority 
and dissent would likely agree that, if that noncitizen wants to bring claims 
“arising from” her removal proceedings, she must wait to do so through the 
petition for review process, once her removal order becomes final. 
But Justice Scalia did not identify or discuss this middle ground. Perhaps 
he was anticipating how lower courts would read the majority’s opinion. If so, 
his prediction was prescient. Although Justice Scalia’s reading of the provision 
eventually became the clear majority approach, several courts prior to Jennings 
adopted the narrow, temporal distinction to which he responded in his dissent. 
C. Divergences After St. Cyr, Before Jennings 
The Supreme Court did not revisit § 1252(b)(9) until 2018—almost two 
decades after St. Cyr was decided. During that period, lower courts that 
addressed § 1252(b)(9) diverged on the provision’s scope. A number of courts 
embraced the temporal reading from St. Cyr and applied § 1252(b)(9) only 
after a removal order had become final.187 Far more influential, however, 
became the “arising from” framework Justice Scalia offered in his dissent.188 
Indeed, the First Circuit and eventually the Ninth Circuit not only embraced 




186 Id. at 328 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187 See infra subsection II.C.1. (discussing the “temporal approach”). 
188 See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text (discussing the Justice Scalia’s opinion in St. Cyr). 
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broadly.189 Although the “arising from” framework has endured—indeed, it is 
the prevailing approach today—this Comment argues that the broad 
interpretation within that framework is incorrect in light of Jennings. 
The scholarship in this area could benefit from a more thorough, nuanced 
analysis of the various strands of § 1252(b)(9) pre-Jennings case law. Such 
analysis, however, is outside the scope of this Comment. Instead, this section 
aims to outline the evolving understanding of this provision in the years 
between St. Cyr and Jennings. 
1. The Temporal Approach 
The St. Cyr majority emphasized that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only with 
respect to review of an order of removal under subsection [1252](a)(1).”190 As 
Justice Scalia seemed to have anticipated in his St. Cyr dissent,191 several 
courts interpreted that limitation to mean that § 1252(b)(9) does not operate 
unless and until a final removal order has been issued.192 This reading 
substantially narrows the range of claims that fall within the scope of 
§ 1252(b)(9), as the provision would pose no barrier to noncitizens bringing 
claims to district court prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings. In 
other words, under this interpretation, the door to district court would be left 
wide open unless and until an order of removal becomes final. 
The Third Circuit most prominently and expressly embraced this narrow 
reading of § 1252(b)(9). In Chehazeh v. Attorney General of the United States, 
after citing the majority language from St. Cyr, the Third Circuit held: 
§ 1252(b)(9) . . . requires only that, when there is an order of removal under 
subsection (a)(1), review of any issues related to that order must be 
consolidated into a single petition for review and cannot be brought 
piecemeal. One may not, for instance, follow a petition for review with a 
habeas petition or a petition for a writ of mandamus.193 
The court continued, explaining that “because § 1252(b) refers only to 
‘review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1),’ it, and its subsections, 
are inapplicable when there is no such order.”194 
 
189 See infra subsection II.B.2 (analyzing the “arising from” framework in Aguilar and J.E. F.M.). 
190 533 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
191 Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s application makes it so 
§ 1252(b)(9) is “given effect only within the review of removal orders that takes place under 
subsection (a)(1),” rendering it meaningless.). 
192 See infra note 199 (collecting cases where the court applied the temporal limitation). 
193 Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 131 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 
194 Id. at 132 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313). Several district courts, including some outside of 
the Third Circuit, expressly followed the Third Circuit’s temporal interpretation. See, e.g., Michalski 
v. Decker, 279 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[The noncitizen] cannot be challenging an order 
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In adopting this view, the Third Circuit concluded that it was joining the 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.195 Although these circuits had similarly 
embraced the St. Cyr majority’s language emphasizing the prefatory clause of 
§ 1252(b), both courts appeared to read it as imposing more of a substantive 
limitation than a temporal limitation.196 
Under this related reading adopted at the time by the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits, § 1252(b)(9) “applies only with respect to review of an order of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),” and therefore the provision applies only 
to claims that “seek[] review of a final order of removal within the meaning 
of § 1252.”197 Thus, the inquiry does not turn on when the claim was brought 
to district court—before or after a removal order becomes final—but whether 
a noncitizen’s claims challenge the substance of “an order of removal.”198 
 
of removal for the common-sense reason that he is not yet subject to one. Consequently, because his 
challenge to the lawfulness of pre-removal detention cannot be connected to that which does not exist, 
§ 1252[(b)(9)] does not bar his petition.” (emphasis added)); De La Paz v. Coy, 954 F. Supp. 2d 532, 
544 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (“Because Plaintiff here is not seeking review of an order of removal—like the 
petitioner in Chehazeh, ‘there has been no such order with respect to him’—section 1252(b)(9) does 
not preclude judicial review of Plaintiff ’s constitutional claims.”); Doe v. Rodriguez, No. 17-1709, 2018 
WL 620898, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2018) (finding jurisdiction over habeas claim because § 1252(a)(5) 
and § 1252(b)(9) are “inapplicable where a petitioner is not challenging an order of removal, including 
in those cases where a removal order has yet to be entered.”) (emphasis added)). 
195 See Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 133 (“We therefore join with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and 
hold that § 1252(b)(9) applies only with respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).”) 
196 See Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a noncitizen’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims “cannot be construed as seeking judicial review of his final 
order of removal” because his success on a habeas petition would lead only to “the restarting of the 
thirty-day period for” filing a petition for review); Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1367 
(11th Cir. 2006) (declining to apply § 1252(b)(9) because “this case does not involve review of an 
order of removal”). For a discussion on later Ninth Circuit precedent, which appeared to diverge 
significantly from Singh, see infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
197 Singh, 499 F.3d at 978-79 (emphasis in original). Indeed, the dissenting justices in Jennings 
eventually adopted a similar—and perhaps identical—reading of the provision. See Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 882 (2018) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not affect 
jurisdiction because “by its terms” that provision “applies only ‘with respect to review of an order of 
removal under [§ 1252(a)(1)]’” (alterations in original) (emphasis added)). 
198 Singh, 499 F.3d at 979; Madu, 470 F.3d at 1367. In Singh, the Ninth Circuit was considering 
an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, which the noncitizen brought to district court after 
his removal order became final. 499 F.3d at 973. Because the noncitizen was not challenging his 
“removal order” but merely seeking a “day in court,” § 1252(b)(9) did not apply. Id. at 979. In Madu, 
because the noncitizen was contesting the very existence of an order of removal, such a challenge 
could not possibly involve review of such an order, and therefore § 1252(b)(9) did not apply. 470 
F.3d at 1367. Notably, this is the precise inquiry courts employed when applying § 1252’s predecessor 
section 106, as discussed supra Section I.A. In Cheng, discussed above, supra note 48 and 
accompanying text, the Supreme Court found that the noncitizen’s claims fell outside the scope of 
a “final order” and thus were not precluded by section 106 of the INA. Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigr. 
and Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S. 206, 216 (1968). Congress, in turn, aimed to foreclose such 
workarounds by adding § 1252(b)(9), which weighs against the adoption of this interpretation of 
§ 1252(b)(9). See Benson, supra note 25, at 1455-57 (describing Congress’ creation of “catch-all 
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To be sure, the substantive and temporal characterizations of § 1252(b)(9) 
are not mutually exclusive. A court that embraces the substantive limitation 
could simultaneously adopt the temporal one advanced by the Third Circuit, 
but no other circuits have clearly embraced the temporal limitation.199 
The temporal reading of § 1252(b)(9) is not without merit. Indeed, it finds 
substantial support in the text and structure of § 1252 and in the legislative 
history of the REAL ID Act of 2005, which added a provision to § 1252 and 
modified others, including § 1252(b)(9).200 
But there are also compelling reasons that weigh against the adoption of this 
reading. Most obviously, as Justice Scalia argued in his St. Cyr dissent, 
interpreting § 1252(b)(9) as unable to channel claims brought prior to the 
issuance of a final removal order seems to render the provision “meaningless.”201 
If § 1252(b)(9) cannot prohibit noncitizens from bringing claims to district court 
prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings, what work is it doing?202 Perhaps 
partly as a result of that question, the temporal interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) 
has been relegated to a minority approach,203 giving way to the “arising from” 
framework, which is the majority approach today. 
 
barriers” intending to supersede the Supreme Court’s decisions in Cheng and McNary, which created 
loopholes in § 1252(b)(9)’s bar against jurisdiction over review of final orders). 
199 However, the five Ninth Circuit judges dissenting from the court’s denial of a rehearing en 
banc argued that Singh stood for—or at least was consistent with—the proposition that the Ninth 
Circuit had adopted the Third Circuit’s temporal interpretation. See J. E. F.M. ex rel. Ekblad v. 
Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“In sum, our precedents, 
guided by the Supreme Court’s understanding in St. Cyr, have repeatedly held that § 1252(b)(9) 
strips district courts of habeas jurisdiction only in cases where a final order of removal has been 
entered and the claim seeks relief from that order.”). 
200 The five Ninth Circuit judges described above, supra note 199, advanced a persuasive 
argument that the text and structure of § 1252, as well as prior circuit case law, supported this 
temporal reading of § 1252(b)(9). J. E. F.M., 908 F.3d at 1162 (Berzon, J., dissenting). There is also 
an argument that legislative intent bolsters this reading. The House Report on the REAL ID Act of 
2005 states, “[The Act] would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are 
independent of challenges to removal orders. Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review only over 
challenges to removal orders.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 299 (emphasis added). Thus, if a noncitizen’s claims are “independent of 
challenges to removal orders,” § 1252(b)(9) poses no obstacle. Id. Claims brought to district court 
prior to the issuance of a final order of removal, the reasoning goes, are necessarily “independent” 
from challenges to removal orders for the simple reason that no such order exists. 
201 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 332 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]o insist that subsection (b)(9) be given effect only within the review of removal 
orders that takes place under subsection (a)(1), is to render it meaningless.”). 
202 Justice Scalia also advanced a persuasive structural argument in his St. Cyr dissent. See id. 
(noting that other numbered subsections such as §§ 1252(b)(7) and (b)(8) would “have no effect if 
they must apply . . . ‘to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1)’”). 
203 See, e.g., O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 130 (D.D.C. 2019) (explicitly rejecting the 
temporal interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 888-
95 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (implicitly rejecting the temporal interpretation because claims were brought 
prior to the issuance of a final removal order, yet the court did not end its analysis). 
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2. The “Arising From” Framework 
The “arising from” framework stems directly from the express language 
of § 1252(b)(9) which states, “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact 
. . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien 
from the United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final 
order . . . .”204 In contrast to the temporal interpretation of St. Cyr, the 
“arising from” framework interprets § 1252(b)(9) as consolidating any 
removal-related claims into a petition for review after a removal order has 
become final.205 Under this reading, the provision can be distilled as follows: 
if a noncitizen wants to bring claims that “arise from” a proceeding brought 
to remove her, she may do so only by later seeking “judicial review of a final 
order [of removal]” through the petition for review process, once it becomes 
available.206 The inquiry in this framework, as the name suggests, turns on 
the phrase “arising from.” The challenge, as will become clear, is that the 
“words ‘arising from’ do not lend themselves to precise application.”207 
After St. Cyr, the First Circuit in Aguilar was the first court of appeals to 
expressly embrace the “arising from” framework.208 In so doing, the court 
construed the phrase quite broadly, describing § 1252(b)(9) as “breathtaking” 
in scope and “vise-like” in grip.209 Under this reading of “arising from,” 
§ 1252(b)(9) applies to almost all claims even remotely related to removal 
proceedings—including those that arise prior to a removal proceeding’s 
 
204 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). As Justice Scalia argued in his St. Cyr dissent, the plain text of the 
provision supports this reading. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 328 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(9) directly to connect the arising from framework to the text of the statute). This approach 
also finds support in Congress’s intent in enacting § 1252(b)(9). With the passage of IIRIRA, which 
added § 1252(b)(9), Congress intended to make clear three things: (1) “only courts of appeals—and 
not district courts—could review a final removal order;” (2) “review of a final removal order is the 
only mechanism for reviewing any issue raised in a removal proceeding;” and (3) the statute was 
“intended to preclude all district court review of any issue raised in a removal proceeding.” H.R. 
Rep. No. 109-72, at 173 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A. 240, 299. 
205 As explained in supra Section II.B, this framework is still consistent with the St. Cyr 
majority opinion, which can be read as holding that even if § 1252(b)(9) does not apply when a 
noncitizen will never be able to access a petition for review, it still applies when a noncitizen will 
eventually be able to bring a petition for review. Thus, under this framework, claims “arising from” 
removal proceedings should eventually be brought to a court of appeals via a petition for review. 
206 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 327-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In other words, if judicial review is 
available, it consists only of [the petition for review process] specified in § 1252(a)(1).”) (emphasis in 
original); see also O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 130-31 (explaining the “arising from” framework from 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in St. Cyr and noting that it is consistent with St. Cyr majority’s opinion). 
207 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Motomura, 
supra note 27, at 424). 
208 Id. at 10 
209 Id. at 9-10. 
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initiation.210 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit later described the First Circuit’s 
reading of “arising from” as one that effectively “swallows up virtually all 
claims that are tied to removal proceedings.”211 
To be sure, the First Circuit recognized that the phrase “arising from” 
imposes some limits on the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Because of that phrase, the 
provision must be read to exclude those claims that are “independent of, or 
wholly collateral to, the removal process.”212 Therefore, independent and 
collateral claims are not subject to the jurisdictional restrictions that § 1252(b)(9) 
imposes. As the First Circuit noted, however, what constitutes a “collateral 
claim” is unclear and has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions.213 
According to the First Circuit’s interpretation in Aguilar, collateral claims 
are primarily those that cannot be handled effectively by the administrative 
process set forth in the INA.214 Because requiring exhaustion of those claims 
would “foreclose them from any meaningful judicial review,” it would frustrate 
Congress’s purpose to channel, rather than bar, such claims.215 Thus, under the 
Aguilar interpretation, courts must seek to delineate between claims that the 
administrative process could handle and those that it could not.216 Claims that 
could be handled are considered “arising from” and thus precluded from 
district court review, while those that could not be handled are considered 
collateral to removal proceedings and thus outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9). 
 
210 See id. at 10 (“[N]othing in the statute limits its reach to claims arising from extant removal 
proceedings.”) (emphasis added). 
211 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016). 
212 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11. 
213 Id. at 12 (“Courts long have recognized an exception to the exhaustion requirement for 
claims that are collateral to administrative proceedings.”). There are a number of Supreme Court 
decisions on point. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1994) (discussing 
whether petitioner’s claims are collateral and reviewing previous cases); Bowen v. City of New York, 
476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986) (“The claims in this lawsuit are collateral to the claims for benefits that class 
members had presented administratively.”) (emphasis added); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618 
(1984) (“The latter exception to exhaustion is inapplicable here where respondents do not raise a 
claim that is wholly ‘collateral’ to their claim for benefits under the Act.”) (emphasis added). 
214 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11 (“[C]laims that cannot effectively be handled through the available 
administrative process fall within [collateral] . . . purview.”). 
215 Id. The First Circuit in Aguilar derives the phrase “meaningful judicial review” from the 
Court’s decision in Thunder Basin. Id. at 12 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13). In that case, 
the Supreme Court found that Congress intended for a certain statute, the Mine Act, to preclude 
district court jurisdiction. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207. The Court stated that “[w]hether a statute 
is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute’s language, structure, 
and purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review.” Id. 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
216 The court in Aguilar noted two specific refinements that would help guide its inquiry: first, 
whether the administrative process could provide “adequate relief ” for the claims. Aguilar, 510 F.3d 
at 12 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976)). Second, whether a party would be 
“‘irreparably injured’” if they were required to adhere to the administrative process. Id. (citing 
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 483). 
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The inquiry, however, does not end there. The final step into whether the 
administrative process can “handle claims effectively” depends on which part 
of the administrative process is evaluated. If the inquiry turns on the 
capabilities of immigration judges, whose authority is quite restricted,217 then 
fewer claims could be “handled effectively” in the administrative process and 
thus there would be more collateral claims that fell outside the purview of 
§ 1252(b)(9). But the Ninth Circuit, which appeared to deviate from earlier 
precedent when it adopted the Aguilar interpretation in J.E. F.M.,218 did not 
center its inquiry on the competencies of the immigration judge. Instead, it 
focused its inquiry on whether claims were cognizable in a petition for review 
before a court of appeals.219 
In J.E. F.M., the court considered constitutional right-to-counsel claims 
of indigent, noncitizen minors who had “tried and failed to obtain pro bono 
counsel for removal proceedings.”220 Borrowing the dramatic language of 
Aguilar that § 1252(b)(9) is “breathtaking” in scope and “vise-like” in grip, the 
court held the provision barred the minors’ claims.221 Because right-to-
counsel claims are “routinely raised in petitions for review filed with a federal 
court of appeals”222 and are “teed up for appellate review,”223 they were 
“bound up in and an inextricable part of the administrative process.”224 
This echoed the holding in Aguilar, where the First Circuit held that 
§ 1252(b)(9) precluded the noncitizens’ right-to-counsel claims because such a 
right “‘possesses a direct link to, and is inextricably intertwined with,” the 
administrative system.225 To arrive at this conclusion, the First Circuit found that 
right-to-counsel claims are “commonplace” and are “often featured in [petitions 
 
217 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 1.5 (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download [https://perma.cc/C2A4-ZFJ5] 
(describing the limited jurisdiction and authority of immigration judges). 
218 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016). For a brief discussion of previous Ninth 
Circuit precedent, see supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text. In the view of five Ninth Circuit 
judges, J.E. F.M. v. Lynch marked a significant break from prior circuit case law. See J. E. F.M. ex 
rel. Ekblad v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1161-63 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
the court in J.E. F.M. wrote prior precedential cases “out of existence”). 
219 J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033 (“[Right-to-counsel] claims are routinely raised in petitions for 
review filed with a federal court of appeals.”). 
220 Id. at 1029. 
221 Id. at 1031-33. The court specified that § 1252(a)(5) worked in tandem with § 1252(b)(9) to 
channel the claims. See id. at 1031 (referring to § 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) and noting that “the provisions 
channel judicial review over final orders of removal to the court of appeals”). For a discussion on 
the relationship between the two provisions, see supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text. 
222 J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033 (citing cases). 
223 Id. at 1038. 
224 Id. at 1032-33. 
225 Id. at 1033 (quoting Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007)) 
(emphasis added). 
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for review] of removal orders” before courts of appeals.226 Thus, because they 
could technically be brought through the petition for review process, barring 
these claims from district court and requiring their administrative exhaustion 
does not “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of such claims.227 
In sum, to determine whether claims could be “effectively handled” by the 
administrative process, the First and Ninth Circuits examined whether claims 
could be brought in a petition for review with a court of appeals—not whether 
immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals could more 
immediately provide the remedies noncitizens sought. And because the 
courts concluded that right-to-counsel claims in both Aguilar and J.E. F.M. 
were “routinely” raised in petitions for review, district court review was 
unnecessary.228 But it bears mentioning that just because a claim is “routinely” 
raised in a petition for review before a court of appeals, it is not tantamount 
to that claim being “effectively handled” in that forum. As will be discussed, 
infra, several courts since Jennings have noted as much.229 
Nevertheless, Aguilar’s influence was significant. The Sixth Circuit cited 
Aguilar approvingly,230 and many district courts—both within and outside the 
First Circuit—applied Aguilar,231 even if in some instances, courts considering 
identical claims came out differently.232 The Ninth Circuit’s full-throated 
 
226 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13. The First Circuit also rejected the noncitizens’ argument that 
requiring exhaustion of their right-to-counsel claims will give rise to a substantive constitutional 
question similar to that discussed in McNary v. Haitan Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991). Aguilar, 510 
F.3d at 13; see also supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (describing the availability of review 
over “pattern and practice” claims that McNary provided). The court found McNary distinguishable 
on several grounds. Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 15. Most relevant for present purposes is that the unlike in 
the special agricultural worker program, where the record was limited for any reviewing tribunal, 
the initial record in Aguilar posed no issue because immigration judges “possess ample evidence-
gathering faculties” and thus the right-to-counsel claims will need “no supplemental factfinding in 
order to create a solid platform for further administrative and judicial review.” Id. 
227 Id. at 14. (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1994)). 
228 J.E. F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033; see also Aguliar, 510 F.3d at 18 (noting that right to counsel claims 
are “commonplace” in petitions for review). 
229 See, e.g., Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2019) 
(explaining that right-to-counsel issues do “sometimes appear in immigration proceedings and 
related [petitions for review], [but] they are cognizable only in a narrow sense”) (emphasis added); 
see also infra Part. III.B.1 (discussing the reviewability considerations). 
230 See Hamdi ex rel. Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with 
the First Circuit’s reasoning that § 1252(b)(9) is a “judicial channeling provision, not a claim-barring 
one”) (quoting Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
231 See, e.g., Robledo v. Chertoff, 658 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693-94 (D. Md. 2009) (“Following the 
Aguilar court’s logic” to determine that certain claims were “collateral” to the removal process and 
therefore were reviewable in district court despite § 1252(b)(9)); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 
F. Supp. 2d 455, 467-68 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that a noncitizen’s challenges to the applicability 
of mandatory detention statute to his offense and his removal order are “intertwined rather than 
independent” of removal and thus § 1252(b)(9) foreclosed jurisdiction) (emphasis added). 
232 Compare Argueta v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 08-1652, 2009 WL 1307236, at *15 
(D.N.J. May 7, 2009) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment Bivens 
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endorsement of Aguilar underscored its influence and the impact it might have 
had if the Supreme Court had not intervened in Jennings just two years later. 
D. The Third Attempt: Jennings v. Rodriguez 
In 2018, the Supreme Court addressed § 1252(b)(9) in Jennings for the first 
time since St. Cyr.233 Jennings involved a class action challenging the prolonged 
detention of noncitizens pending the completion of their removal 
proceedings, including judicial review.234 Although neither party raised 
§ 1252(b)(9),235 the Court addressed the provision head on, resulting in three 
divergent opinions.236 Cobbled together, the Court concluded, 6-2, that 
§ 1252(b)(9) did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the challenge 
to prolonged detention during removal proceedings.237 
Justice Breyer, writing for three dissenting justices, took the narrowest 
view of § 1252(b)(9) in a brief, two-sentence paragraph, stating: 
Jurisdiction also is unaffected by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which by its terms 
applies only ‘[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under 
 
claim because if denied review in the district court, there would be “no forum where he can seek 
redress of his grievances against the government”), with Arias v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 
No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 1827604, at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) bars 
noncitizen’s Bivens claims because they are “common in removal proceedings” and could “directly 
impact Plaintiffs’ immigration status”). 
233 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-40 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(discussing § 1252(b)(9) and the prior precedents of the Court interpreting its meaning). 
234 Id. at 838. The certified class, of which Rodriguez was representative, included noncitizens 
who “are or were detained . . . pending completion of removal proceedings.” Id. 
235 Id. at 853 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“Although neither party raises § 1252(b)(9), this 
Court has an independent obligation to assess whether it deprives us and the lower courts of 
jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). 
236 In his concurrence in part, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concluded that § 
1252(b)(9) apply to the claims at issue. Id. at 853-59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Writing for 
the plurality, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the 
claims did not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). Id. at 839-41 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). In 
dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, agreed that the claims did not 
fall within the provision's ambit but read it more narrowly than did the plurality. Id. at 876 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). Justice Kagan took no part in the decision. Id. at 852. 
237 See supra note 236 (reviewing alignment of the justices of the Court on the jurisdiction 
question). Although there was no controlling opinion on the jurisdictional issue, six justices agreed 
that § 1252(b)(9) did not preclude district court jurisdiction over this challenge to prolonged 
detention during removal proceedings. Id. Normally, the “Supreme Court creates precedent only 
when [a majority of] Justices endorse a single rule of decision . . . .” Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks 
Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1943 (2019). The main exception, however, was established in Marks 
v. United States, which provides: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’” 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
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[§ 1252(a)(1)].’ § 1252(b). Respondents challenge their detention without bail, 
not an order of removal.238 
Like the St. Cyr majority, Justice Breyer’s dissent appears to give 
significant weight to the prefatory clause of § 1252(b), which limits the reach 
of § 1252(b)(9) solely to claims challenging “an order of removal.”239 Under 
this interpretation, the inquiry of § 1252(b)(9)’s application turns on whether 
a noncitizen’s claims challenge “an order of removal,” not whether they are 
arising from some removal action.240 Claims challenging detention without 
bail, the dissent suggested, are distinct from those challenging “an order of 
removal” and thus fall outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9).241 
Justice Thomas, writing for the two justices concurring in part, took 
perhaps the broadest possible view of § 1252(b)(9). For one, he discarded the 
dissent’s narrow interpretation that § 1252(b)(9) is restricted to challenges to 
removal orders.242 Justice Thomas first noted that the text of § 1252(b)(9) 
“refers to review of ‘all questions of law and fact’ arising from removal,’ not 
just removal orders.”243 In addition, by interpreting § 1252(b)(9) as governing 
only removal orders, the dissent would “render superfluous § 1252(a)(5), 
which already specifies that the review made available under § 1252(a)(1) ‘shall 
be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.’”244 
Under Justice Thomas’s interpretation, claims that challenge detention 
during removal proceedings, like the claim at issue in Jennings, “fall within 
the heartland of § 1252(b)(9).”245 Justice Thomas reasoned that the phrase 
“any action taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” must at least 
include any “congressionally authorized portions of the deportation process 
that necessarily serve the purpose of ensuring an alien’s removal.”246 Since 
detention is merely one step of the prescribed process to remove a noncitizen, 
the challenge at issue must “arise from” removal proceedings.247 In other 
words, as long as the events that gave rise to the noncitizen’s claims would 
 
238 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. This is the same reading that the Ninth Circuit adopted in Singh, before J.E. F.M., and 
the one the Eleventh Circuit adopted in Madu. For a more detailed discussion of this interpretation, 
see supra note 198. 
241 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
242 Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
243 Id. (emphasis in original). 
244 Id. (emphasis in original). 
245 Id. at 854. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. In his analysis, Justice Thomas blurred the “arising from” inquiry with the “action taken 
to remove” inquiry. As the plurality highlighted, “[t]he question is not whether detention is an action 
taken to remove an alien but whether the legal questions in this case arise from such an action.” Id. at 
841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). 
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not have happened but for the removal action, those claims “arise from” that 
action and are swallowed by § 1252(b)(9). 
Even though Justice Thomas qualified his conclusion by suggesting that 
§ 1252(b)(9) may not cover claims challenging actions which “go beyond the 
government’s lawful pursuit of its removal objective,”248 he took an expansive 
view of the provision. Indeed, his interpretation extended § 1252(b)(9) even 
beyond the scope of the First Circuit’s interpretation in Aguilar. Aguilar was at 
least clear that § 1252(b)(9) did not affect district courts’ jurisdiction over 
challenges to the legality of immigration detention.249 Under Justice Thomas’s 
approach, exceedingly few challenges would escape the strictures of § 1252(b)(9). 
The three-justice plurality authored by Justice Alito took a middle-ground 
approach. Although it voiced skepticism, the plurality assumed for the sake 
of argument Justice Thomas’s contention that detention is an “action 
taken . . . to remove an alien.”250 Justice Alito’s analysis, thus, turned on 
whether the legal questions before the Court arose from those actions taken 
to remove the aliens.251 
In finding that the legal questions in Jennings did not “arise from” a 
removal action and thus fell outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9), the plurality 
made several important observations about the scope of the provision. 
First, the plurality flatly rejected the broad, “but for” test suggested by 
Justice Thomas. It noted that this “expansive interpretation” of § 1252(b)(9) 
would have “staggering results”252 and provided three examples to illustrate 
the kinds of claims that would be barred by such an interpretation: a Bivens 
claims based on inhumane conditions of confinement; a state-law assault 
claim against a guard or fellow detainee; and a tort claim against a truck driver 
or owner who hit the bus transporting noncitizens to a detention facility.253 
Although these injuries would not have occurred but for the government’s 
decision to place the noncitizens in detention, “cramming judicial review of 
those questions into the review of final removal orders would be absurd.”254 
Put simply, these challenges do not arise from removal proceedings or an 
action taken to remove a noncitizen. 
Second, the plurality expressed concern about reviewability. Adopting an 
extreme but for formulation of claims “arising from” removal orders would 
 
248 Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
249 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
§ 1252(b)(9) does not preclude district court jurisdiction over claims challenging detention). 
250 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (questioning whether detention 
actually is an “action taken . . . to remove an alien”). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
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make claims of prolonged detention, like the one at issue in Jennings, 
“effectively unreviewable.”255 The justices in the plurality were concerned 
about two distinct but related outcomes. In one, a final order of removal is 
eventually entered but the injury has already taken place, so judicial review 
would fail to remedy the harm.256 In the other, no order of removal is ever 
issued and thus the petition for review process never becomes available, so the 
noncitizen would be deprived of “any meaningful chance for judicial review.”257 
Finally, the plurality cautioned against adopting “uncritical literalism” when 
interpreting “capacious phrases” such as “arising from.”258 It recalled the Court’s 
approach in Reno v. AADC, where it narrowly construed identical language 
from a neighboring provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The Jennings plurality 
explained that the Court “did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim 
that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions. . . . Instead, 
we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”259 
With these warnings in mind, the plurality concluded that it was not 
necessary to “attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation” of 
§ 1252(b)(9).260 Instead, “[f]or present purposes,” it was “enough” that the 
noncitizen detainees here were “not asking for review of an order of removal; 
they [were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or 
to seek removal; and they [were] not even challenging any part of the process 
by which their removability will be determined.”261 The plurality also noted 
that even if detention were an “action taken to remove an alien,” as Justice 
Thomas argued, the legal questions are “too remote” to be said to “arise from” 
such an action.262 Therefore, the claims at issue did not fall within the scope 
of § 1252(b)(9) and the district court rightfully retained jurisdiction. 
Between the three justices in the plurality’s jurisdictional analysis and 




257 Id. In the recent case that overturned the district court’s adverse decision in Efrain and 
Mia’s case, the Third Circuit distilled a “now-or-never” principle from Jennings, Preap—which largely 
repeated the positions of Jennings, see infra Section III.B—and the presumptions favoring judicial 
review. See E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2020). 
Although the principle will be more closely examined in Part III, it is worth noting here that Justice 
Alito’s discussion of reviewability circles around the concept of “now-or-never.” See Jennings, 138 S. 
Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (“Interpreting ‘arising from’ in this extreme way would also 
make claims of prolonged detention effectively unreviewable.”). 
258 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
259 Id. at 841 (emphasis added). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 841 n.3 (quotation marks omitted). 
824 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 783 
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar claims challenging prolonged detention without a 
bond hearing, even when detainees had ongoing removal proceedings.263 
A year after Jennings, Justice Alito, joined now by Justice Kavanaugh and 
again by Chief Justice Roberts, essentially reprised these positions in Nielsen 
v. Preap, finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not preclude district court jurisdiction 
over a challenge raising the question of whether noncitizens were subject to 
mandatory detention when the government failed to detain them 
immediately after their release from state court.264 It stated: 
As in Jennings, respondents here ‘are not asking for review of an order of 
removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place 
or to seek removal . . . ; and they are not even challenging any part of the 
process by which their removability will be determined. Under these 
circumstances . . . § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.’265 
After Jennings and Preap, lower courts were left to make sense of the 
Supreme Court’s fractured jurisdictional holdings.266 
III. POST-JENNINGS AND THE PRESENT STATE OF § 1252(b)(9) 
Jennings failed to provide lower courts with clear guidance on how to 
construe § 1252(b)(9). Perhaps as a result, litigation implicating § 1252(b)(9) 
has proliferated since Jennings,267 underscoring the need for a comprehensive 
 
263 Id. at 841, 876. 
264 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 960-62 (2019). 
265 Id. at 962 (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)). 
266 As mentioned before, the Supreme Court has—to varying degrees—discussed § 1252(b)(9) in 
three cases since Preap was decided. See supra note 29. Of the three cases to treat the provision, 
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California adds the most to the discussion. 
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). In Regents, the Court determined that the Trump administration’s rescission of 
DACA was unlawful. Id.; see also Meghan Downey & Adam Garnick, Explaining the Supreme Court’s 
DACA Decision, REG. REV. (July 7, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/07/downey-garnick-
explaining-supreme-court-daca-decision/ [https://perma.cc/93JJ-4PZX] (explaining the Court’s 
analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act challenges to the DACA recission). In so holding, the 
Court discussed § 1252(b)(9) and held the provision did not present a jurisdictional bar to petitioners’ 
challenge to the DACA recission. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907. As in Preap, the Court articulated the same 
rule from Jennings. Id. Importantly, however, it went further, holding that § 1252(b)(9) “is certainly not 
a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging any removal proceedings.” In addition, the Court 
described the language of § 1252(b)(9) as “targeted” and “narrow.” Id. This language was almost 
immediately seized upon by at least two circuit courts. See Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Regents in overturning 
district court’s expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) because it “does not square with that provision’s 
‘narrow’ scope”); Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf ’t, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar challenge to the use of immigration detainers in part because the 
Supreme Court has “instructed that [the provision] is . . . ‘targeted’ and ‘narrow’”). 
267 In the roughly three years since Jennings, at least 200 cases have cited the provision. See 
infra Appendix (listing cases). To be sure, pure citation-count is an imperfect proxy to support the 
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synthesis of the law in its current form. This Part aims to provide that in three 
steps. First, this Part contends that Jennings, fractured as it was, undercut the 
broad interpretation of “arising from” previously embraced by the First and 
Ninth Circuits. Second, this Part lays out a roadmap of the law,268 based on 
Jennings and other recent Supreme Court cases, that sets the stage for a 
narrower reading of “arising from”. Finally, this Part analyzes the specific 
factors and frameworks that courts have relied on when construing “arising 
from” in light of the narrower reading that Jennings commands. 
A. The Conflict Between Jennings and the Aguilar Interpretation 
Although it did not do so explicitly, the Jennings Court rejected the Aguilar 
interpretation of “arising from,” and counseled in favor of a quite narrow 
reading of that phrase.269 On a purely semantic level, the language of the 
Jennings plurality runs counter to the broad, dramatic language used in the 
Aguilar interpretation, which described § 1252(b)(9) as “breathtaking in 
scope” and “vice-like in grip.”270 The plurality cautioned against an 
“expansive” reading of § 1252(b)(9) and expressed concern over the 
“staggering results” that would result from “cramming judicial review” of 
certain claims into a petition for review of final removal orders.271 The three 
justices in the plurality also recalled the Court’s narrow reading of § 1252(g) 
in AADC, noting that any interpretation of “arising from” must avoid the 
“uncritical literalism” that could lead to results that “no sensible person could 
have intended.”272 Coupled with the three dissenters who embraced the even 
narrower interpretation,273 six of eight justices involved in Jennings urged 
lower courts not to adopt a broad reading of § 1252(b)(9). 
But the interpretive conflict is not merely semantic. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jennings substantively narrowed the scope of § 1252(b)(9) as 
interpreted by Aguilar and its progeny. One district court in the Ninth Circuit 
 
proposition that Jennings initiated a wave of litigation, but the stark difference in number of cases 
pre- and post-Jennings is noteworthy. The Trump administration’s severe immigration policies may 
have also contributed to the uptick in challenges implicating § 1252(b)(9). See, e.g., Casa De 
Maryland v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 691 (4th Cir. 2019) (challenging DACA 
rescission); O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2019) (challenging the policy popularly 
refenced as the “asylum ban”). 
268 See supra, note 29 (discussing the Supreme Court cases that addressed § 1252(b)(9) after Jennings). 
269 As mentioned, this assertion is further supported by the Court’s discussion of the provision 
in Regents in which it explicitly described it as “targeted” and “narrow.” 140 S. Ct. at 1907; see also 
supra notes 29, 266, (discussing Regents in more detail). 
270 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2007). 
271 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
272 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
273 Id. at 876 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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suggested that its circuit’s precedent, which most notably includes J.E. F.M., 
treats § 1252(b)(9) “too broadly in light of the Jennings plurality’s rejection of 
an ‘expansive’ interpretation of ‘arising from’ that would sweep a claim into 
Section 1252(b)(9) simply because an alien is in removal proceedings or a 
removal action was taken.”274 Likewise, after reviewing prior case law that 
interpreted § 1252(b)(9) as expansive in scope, a district court in the Second 
Circuit noted, “as the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in [Jennings] 
explained, § 1252(b)(9) should not be construed broadly.”275 
A district court case that reconsidered and partially reversed in light of 
Jennings best illustrates the substantive narrowing. In that case, the district 
court was confronted with noncitizens’ Fifth Amendment claims regarding 
the government’s alleged failure to promptly present them to an immigration 
judge for a probable cause determination.276 Prior to Jennings, the district 
court found that the pre-hearing custody decisions were “inextricably linked” 
with removal proceedings because the initial hearing is a “crucial stage of the 
removal proceedings.”277  
In reconsidering the case after Jennings, however, the district court 
reversed.278 It found that the Fifth Amendment claims did not “arise from” 
any of the challenges to removal listed in Jennings that § 1252(b)(9) might 
circumscribe.279 Moreover, it held that if the noncitizens could not bring their 
claims to district court, those claims might become “effectively unreviewable,” 
an outcome the Jennings plurality explicitly cautioned against.280 
 
274 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2018); see also Las 
Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Trump, No. 19-20051, 2020 WL 4431682, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 
2020) (“Defendants rely heavily on language in J.E. F.M. that characterizes § 1252(b)(9) as 
‘breathtaking’ in its scope . . . . In determining the scope of § 1252(b)(9), however, this Court must 
look not only to J.E. F.M. but also to Jennings . . . which appears to adopt a somewhat more limited 
view of the scope of § 1252(b)(9).”); Roy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 12-09012, 2018 WL 914773, at 
*18 (C.D. Cal. Feb 7, 2018) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar claims pertaining to ICE 
detainers, as these actions occur before and oftentimes independently from “any decision to 
commence removal proceedings”); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 893 (N.D. 
Ill. 2020) (citing Roy for the proposition that the language in Jennings counseled against an expansive 
interpretation of “arising from”). 
275 P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 21, 2019) 
276 Castellar v. Nielsen, No. 17-0491, 2018 WL 786742, at *6, *12-13 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018). A 
“probable cause determination” refers to DHS seeking prompt judicial review and approval of their 
detention of noncitizens, consistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ requirement that 
seizures by government agents are reasonable and noncitizens are afforded due process. HILLEL R. 
SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10375, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: BACKGROUND AND 
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2019). 
277 Castellar, 2018 WL 786742 at *12. 
278 Cancino-Castellar, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
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Claims outside the detention context that were likely to have been swept 
into § 1252(b)(9) under the Aguilar approach have likewise fallen outside the 
provision’s strictures in light of Jennings. Several courts, including one district 
court in the Ninth Circuit, have found that right-to-counsel claims fall outside 
the reach of § 1252(b)(9), despite the contrary holdings of J.E. F.M. and Aguilar, 
which held that § 1252(b)(9) prohibited district court review of those claims.281  
Likewise, multiple district courts have found that § 1252(b)(9) does not 
foreclose their jurisdiction where a noncitizen challenged the legality of ICE’s 
conduct during their initial stop and detention.282 This makes sense given that 
the Jennings plurality warned courts not to “cram” such challenges into the 
administrative process.283 Under the Aguilar interpretation, these claims would 
likely have been swallowed by § 1252(b)(9) given their nexus to removal 
proceedings, even though they arose prior to the initiation of removal 
proceedings and thus were at risk of never receiving any judicial review.284 
In sum, Jennings, despite lacking a majority opinion, undercut the broad 
Aguilar interpretation of § 1252(b)(9). How exactly lower courts have applied 
Jennings to effectuate its narrower construction of “arising from” is a more 
complicated question. 
B. The State of the Law: Interpreting “Arising From” 
To properly situate the factors and frameworks courts have employed 
when construing “arising from,” it is worth providing a brief roadmap of the 
 
281 See E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(concluding that constitutional right-to-counsel claims are not barred by § 1252(b)(9)); Arroyo v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2019) 
(represented noncitizens’ claims not barred by § 1252(b)(9)); Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (represented and unrepresented noncitizens’ 
claims not barred by § 1252(b)(9)). 
282 See, e.g., Nak Kim Chhoeun v. Marin, No. 17-01898, 2018 WL 1941756, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
26, 2018) (finding district court jurisdiction over claims challenging the government’s failure to 
notify petitioners of changed circumstances justifying detention and deportation); Tun-Cos v. 
Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *1, *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) (finding district court 
jurisdiction over an action for damages following an allegedly unlawful search by government 
agents); Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (finding district 
court jurisdiction over claims challenging “indiscriminate, large-scale immigration sweeps”). 
283 See J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. 
& Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007)) (noting that § 1252(b)(9) “swallows up virtually all 
claims that are tied to removal proceedings”). 
284 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). See infra subsection 
III.B.2 (discussing how claims arising prior to the initiation of removal proceedings do not fall into 
the scope of § 1252(b)(9) in light of Jennings). 
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current law as it stands after Jennings and other recent Supreme Court cases.285 
At this point, courts understand § 1252(b)(9) to function as a “zipper 
clause”286 meant to “consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings 
into one action in the court of appeals.”287 By its own terms, the provision 
applies only to legal questions that “arise from” removal proceedings and does 
not encompass claims that are “too remote from” such proceedings.288 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet offered a comprehensive 
interpretation of “arising from,”289 it has repeatedly urged that the phrase 
should be construed narrowly.290 In addition, the Court has explained that 
claims that do not challenge (1) an order of removal, (2) the government’s 
decision to seek removal, or (3) the process by which removability will be 
determined categorically do not “arise from” removal proceedings and thus do 
not fall within § 1252(b)(9)’s reach.291 Likewise, claims that do not challenge 
any removal proceedings “certainly” do not “arise from” such proceedings.292 
Therefore, if claims do not challenge one of these enumerated categories, 
§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar and the court’s analysis ends.  
But when a claim does not fall cleanly outside one of those enumerated 
categories—when it presents a closer call—lower courts since Jennings have applied 
a range of factors to construe “arising from,” some of which are more useful than 
others in how they effectuate the narrow reading that Jennings commands.  
This subsection argues that reviewability—one of the leading factors 
courts have employed—should turn on whether an immigration judge has the 
ability to grant the relief sought. It further contends that a “timeframe 
consideration” categorically excludes § 1252(b)(9) from swallowing any claims 
that challenge actions arising prior to the commencement of removal 
proceedings. After those discussions, it surveys other important factors and 
occasionally offers their benefits and drawbacks. 
 
285 To be clear, the case law of § 1252(b)(9) is rapidly changing within each circuit, but this 
introduction draws upon several recent Supreme Court decisions to provide an overview of where 
the law stands across all jurisdictions. 
286 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020) (referring to § 1252(b)(9) as a 
“zipper clause”). 
287 Id. 
288 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
289 Id. at 841 (noting that it was “not necessary for us to attempt to provide a comprehensive 
interpretation” of § 1252(b)(9)). 
290 See id. at 840 (cautioning against an expansive reading of “arising from”). See also Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (describing § 1252(g) 
and § 1252(b)(9), which both contain the phrase “arising from,” as “similarly narrow”). 
291 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion); see also Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907 
(quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct at 841 for this proposition). 
292 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907. 
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1. Reviewability 
Reviewability—whether claims will receive adequate judicial review—has 
been at the center of § 1252(b)(9) jurisprudence since the provision was 
enacted. In fact, the Supreme Court in McNary provided an avenue around 
the strictures of § 1252(b)(9)’s predecessor because if noncitizens were “not 
allowed to pursue their claims in the District Court, [they] would not as a 
practical matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review . . . .”293 
“Meaningful judicial review” has remained a baseline consideration in 
determining whether claims are channeled by § 1252(b)(9).294 The Jennings 
plurality highlighted as much when it warned that interpreting “arising from” 
in an “extreme way” would make some claims “effectively unreviewable.”295 Of 
course, as one district court aptly noted, reviewability is not the sole factor 
used to determine whether § 1252(b)(9) prohibits a district court from having 
jurisdiction over certain claims.296 If it were, the Jennings plurality would have 
ended its analysis once it discussed reviewability, which it did not.297 But at 
minimum, “meaningful judicial review” remains a significant—and perhaps 
the leading—factor courts use when construing § 1252(b)(9). 
Determining what exactly “meaningful review” requires is a fraught but 
critical exercise. The Aguilar interpretation tended to look at whether claims 
were cognizable in a petition for review before the court of appeals.298 Aguilar 
itself stated that § 1252(b)(9) applies to claims that were “cognizable within 
the review process” established by Congress.299 But the Aguilar court was less 
clear on precisely what that inquiry entailed. Did this mean cognizable before 
an immigration judge, or eventually cognizable in a petition for review before 
the court of appeals? 
Almost ten years later, J.E. F.M. helped answer that question. There, the 
Ninth Circuit embraced the Aguilar interpretation and rejected the argument 
that the unaccompanied minors’ right-to-counsel claims would be denied any 
 
293 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991). 
294 Id.; see J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2016) (analyzing whether 
foreclosing the noncitizen minors’ claims would deny them “meaningful judicial review”). 
295 138 S. Ct. at 840 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). It bears emphasizing that 
Congress meant § 1252(b)(9) to be a claims challenging provision, “not a claims-barring one.” Aguilar 
v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
296 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
297 Id. 
298 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he most 
salient questions involve whether the underlying claims are cognizable within the review process 
established by Congress, and if so, whether enforcement of the exhaustion requirement will allow 
meaningful judicial review without inviting an irreparable injury.”); see, e.g., Arroyo v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2019) (“Reviewability by 
an [immigration judge] is not the standard as to whether an action is unreviewable.”). 
299 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 17. 
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meaningful judicial review because “a right-to-counsel claim is teed up for 
appellate review,” despite conceding that neither the immigration judge nor 
the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to provide the requested 
relief.300 The “reviewability” inquiry, then, under the Aguilar interpretation 
as clarified in J.E. F.M. focused on whether claims were cognizable at the 
petition for review level—it did not examine whether immigration judges or 
the Board of Immigration Appeals had the ability to provide relief. 
Lower courts since Jennings, however, have looked at another part of the 
administrative process: whether the immigration judge could provide the 
requested relief. In O.A. v. Trump, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia considered in depth the scope of § 1252(b)(9), in light of Jennings.301 
Holding that a challenge to the Trump administration’s “asylum ban” was not 
barred by § 1252(b)(9), the court dedicated much of its opinion to concerns 
of reviewability.302 In particular, it stated, “Plaintiffs’ challenges are also 
outside the . . . competence and expertise of asylum officers, immigration 
judges, and the [Board of Immigration Appeals].”303 Even if the claims could 
eventually be “teed up” for appellate review through a petition for review, 
that would be insufficient to prohibit district court jurisdiction under 
§ 1252(b)(9). Instead, courts must look at the abilities of the initial 
decisionmakers—the immigration judges and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals officials who are responsible for responding during removal 
processes to noncitizens’ requests for relief. 
Courts have employed this inquiry across several contexts. In conditions 
of confinement cases, for example, one court explained that “interpreting 
section 1252(b)(9) to reach [such claims] would be problematic, especially 
because Immigration Judges are ‘powerless to remedy the conditions 
alleged.’”304 Likewise, in a case considering a challenge to the rescission of an 
individual’s DACA status, the district court found determinative that because 
“an immigration judge in a removal proceeding does not have the power to 
grant or deny deferred action, or to review or reverse an agency’s decision to 
revoke it,” § 1252(b)(9) posed no jurisdictional bar.305 In the Bivens context, 
 
300 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). To be sure, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that constitutional claims fell within a “narrow exception” whereby a court of 
appeals could still consider those claims although they were not raised during administrative 
proceedings. Id. 
301 O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 134-38 (D.D.C. 2019). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 137 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 (2010)). 
304 S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-760, 2020 WL 3265533, at *16 
(D.D.C. June 17, 2020) (citing Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 
(C.D. Cal. 2019)). 
305 Inland Empire—Immigrant Youth Collective v. Nielsen, No. 17-2048, 2018 WL 4998230, at 
*14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (emphasis in original). 
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numerous cases have applied the same logic: because immigration judges 
cannot award damages, these claims escape the reach of § 1252(b)(9).306 
In Efrain and Mia’s case, the Third Circuit held that § 1252(b)(9) did not 
bar most of Efrain and Mia’s claims, including their Fifth Amendment right-
to-counsel due process claim.307 The court centered its decision—particularly 
its “arising from” inquiry—on reviewability.308 The court distilled a principle 
from Jennings, Preap, and “the presumptions favoring judicial review,” which 
essentially compels courts to ask: If a noncitizen cannot obtain judicial review 
now, then will meaningful review be available at all?309 Put differently, if it 
will be too late to remedy the harm later, the district court must have 
jurisdiction to review—and potentially remedy—the harm now. 
In effect, the Third Circuit’s “now-or-never principle” requires courts to 
assess the competencies of immigration judges and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, because the principle is primarily concerned with the urgency of the 
claims and the ability of the administrative process to remedy that harm. 
In another right-to-counsel case, a district court found that the “limited 
jurisdiction of Immigration Judges” weighed in favor of finding that 
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar right-to-counsel claims.310 The court explained that 
even though right-to-counsel issues do sometimes appear in removal 
proceedings and related petitions for review, “[t]hey are cognizable only in a 
narrow sense.”311 In the petition for review context, the focus is “categorically 
different” than it would be in a full hearing on the merits because the only 
question in a petition for review is “whether to overturn a decision below,” 
rather than to conduct a thorough review of the removal proceeding.312 Such 
reasoning strongly suggests that confining judicial review of right-to-counsel 
claims to the petition for review process would risk shortchanging the 
noncitizens’ opportunity to obtain “meaningful judicial review.” 
In sum, in light of Jennings, the proper inquiry into reviewability examines 
the competencies of the immigration judge and whether she can provide 
 
306 See, e.g., Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) 
(holding § 1252(b)(9) does not bar Bivens claims partly because the immigration judge cannot grant 
Plaintiffs the relief they seek); Rueda Vidal v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-9276, 2019 WL 
7899948, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2019), rev’d on other grounds, Rueda Vidal v. Bolton, 822 F. App’x 
643 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because claims for damages are not available in removal proceedings, they are 
collateral to that process for purposes of Section 1252(b)(9).”); cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 
830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that interpreting § 1252(b)(9) to encompass 
Bivens claims would be “absurd”). 
307 E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184-87 (3d Cir. 2020). 
308 See id. (analyzing whether claims would be subject to meaningful review). 
309 Id. at 185-86. 
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relief.313 It no longer focuses on what type of claims could eventually be “teed 
up” for appellate review.314 As a result, an array of claims that may have been 
(and indeed were) encompassed by § 1252(b)(9) under the Aguilar 
interpretation now fall outside its reach. 
2. Timeframe 
A closely related factor is “timeframe,” which examines the point during 
removal proceedings at which the claims were brought or the challenged actions 
occurred. This factor can be distilled into the following bright-line rule: claims 
challenging actions that occurred before the initiation of removal proceedings 
categorically do not fall within the reach of § 1252(b)(9). 
To some extent, similar concerns that underpin the reviewability 
consideration support the timeframe consideration. If § 1252(b)(9) foreclosed 
district court review for claims arising prior to the initiation of removal 
proceedings, there is no guarantee that the government will ever issue a 
removal order, much less commence removal proceedings in the first place. In 
either instance, the noncitizen never has an opportunity to bring claims 
through a petition for review and would be completely deprived of any judicial 
review.315 This is precisely the “absurd” result Jennings sought to avoid.316 
But reviewability on its own, as explained, cannot form the basis of the 
categorical rule proposed here.317 What pushes the timeframe consideration 
into the realm of a categorical rule is that any claims arising prior to removal 
proceedings present legal questions that the Jennings plurality warned would 
be “too remote” from such proceedings to be said to “arise from” them.318 
Courts previously applying the Aguilar interpretation, however, did not 
share the same concern. In Aguilar itself, removal proceedings had not been 
initiated by the time that the noncitizens brought their claims to district 
court.319 Even still, the court held that § 1252(b)(9) could still channel the 
noncitizens’ claims into a petition for review because the provision’s scope 
 
313 Cf. Urbina v. Barr, No. 20-325, 2020 WL 3002344, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2020) (focusing the 
inquiry on whether claims are cognizable at the petition for review stage, noting that “Urbina can 
challenge his removability in a petition for review filed with the Fourth Circuit, which has the clear 
authority to adjudicate whether an alien’s prior convictions are crimes involving moral turpitude”). 
314 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). 
315 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that if § 1252(b)(9) applied to certain claims prior to the issuance of an order of removal, 
it would make such claims “effectively unreviewable”). 
316 Id. 
317 See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text (noting that Jennings implies that 
reviewability cannot be the only factor in the “arising from” analysis). 
318 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the legal 
questions at issue were “too remote” from the actions taken to fall within § 1252(b)(9)). 
319 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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was not limited to claims arising from “extant removal proceedings.”320 That 
is no longer the case after Jennings. 
Since Jennings, several courts have held that § 1252(b)(9) cannot channel 
claims brought prior to the initiation of removal proceedings. In Innovation 
Law Lab v. Nielsen, a case that considered a challenge to the conditions of 
pre-hearing detention, the district court found it could not have constituted 
a challenge to removal proceedings for the obvious reason that such 
proceedings had not yet commenced.321 It noted that the Jennings plurality 
cautioned against reading § 1252(b)(9) in a way that makes certain claims 
“effectively unreviewable.”322 Because foreclosing jurisdiction may have 
denied all avenues to judicial review, that consequence weighed heavily 
against applying § 1252(b)(9).323 But that alone would not suffice. The 
lynchpin, according to the court, was that the legal questions at issue—raised 
before removal proceedings even commenced—were simply “too remote” 
from removal proceedings to be said to “arise from” them, leading the court 
to hold that § 1252(b)(9) did not apply to the claims.324 
The same was true in Al Otro Lado, Inc v. McAleenan, a case in which 
noncitizens challenged restrictive policies that prohibited certain individuals 
from applying for asylum in the first place.325 The court held that since the 
entire goal of the suit was to commence removal proceedings so that plaintiffs 
could apply for asylum, they could not possibly be challenging such 
proceedings.326 As a result, the court held § 1252(b)(9) posed no obstacle to 
the noncitizens’ claims.327 
Under this categorical timeframe rule, even if removal proceedings have 
commenced by the time the claims are brought to district court, § 1252(b)(9) 
does not present a jurisdictional bar as long as the actions occurred prior. In 
one case, which considered noncitizens’ challenge to ICE’s use of detainers to 
apprehend them in the first place, the court held that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs’ 
. . . claims relate to the ICE officers’ actions before removal proceedings were 
filed . . . the Court finds that they are independent of the removal process.”328 
 
320 Id. at 6-9, 10. 
321 Innovation L. Lab v. Nielsen, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1071-77 (D. Or. 2018). 
322 Id. at 1077 (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)). 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 1078. 
325 Al Otro Lado, Inc v. McAleenan, 432 F. Supp. 3d 848, 859-61 (S.D. Cal. 2019) 
326 See id. at 863 (“The Government does not allege that any Plaintiff is in removal proceedings 
or that a final order of removal has been issued as to any Plaintiff. . . . In fact, the very relief 
Plaintiffs seek is to commence such proceedings and have their asylum claims adjudicated.”). 
327 Id. 
328 Roy v. Los Angeles Cnty., No. 12-09012, 2018 WL 914773, at *18 (quoting Medina v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C17-218, 2017 WL 2954719, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2017)). 
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The district court in Nava v. Department of Homeland Security reached a 
similar conclusion in a class action challenge to ICE’s allegedly race-based 
traffic stops, which led to the arrest and detention of several individuals.329 
There, the court observed that “the risk that certain Plaintiffs could be 
precluded from presenting their claims in any forum weighs in favor of a 
finding that Section 1252(b)(9) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.”330 
In addition to the reviewability concerns, what ultimately pushed the claims 
outside the provision’s scope was that the plaintiffs’ challenges to “[a]n illegal 
stop conducted before the government has any legitimate reason to believe the 
subject is removable” were “too remote from removal actions to fall within the 
scope of § 1252(b)(9), and therefore did not ‘arise from’ them.”331 
When claims “arise from” actions that occur before the initiation of removal 
proceedings, they cannot be barred by § 1252(b)(9). For one, reviewability 
concerns are particularly heightened because there is a risk that an individual is 
deprived of any and all judicial review, which is an unacceptable outcome. If 
removal proceedings are never initiated or if the noncitizen obtains relief, an 
opportunity to bring claims through a petition for review will never manifest. 
It is tautological that events occurring prior to the commencement of removal 
proceedings present legal questions that are “too remote from” such 
proceedings.332 Indeed, two years after Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that 
claims “not challenging any removal proceedings” “certainly” do not arise from 
such proceedings.333 Therefore, this timeframe consideration provides a simple 
rule that any claims that challenge action occurring prior to the initiation of 
removal proceedings must not “arise from” such proceedings and thus fall outside 
the sweep of § 1252(b)(9). The bright-line rule this creates is a helpful tool for 
district courts confronted with these types of claims, as it would allow them to 
quickly dispose of challenges to their jurisdiction on § 1252(b)(9) grounds. 
3. Nature of the Right 
Courts have recently paid more attention to the nature of the right that 
was allegedly violated. Generally, if claims assert rights that afford 
 
329 Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2020). 
330 Id. at 894 (emphasis added). This language mirrors that of the Supreme Court’s in St. Cyr: 
“If it were clear that the question of law could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be 
permissible to accept the INS’ reading of § 1252. But the absence of such a forum, coupled with the 
lack of [an express statement to repeal habeas], strongly counsels against adopting a construction 
that would raise serious constitutional questions.” Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 314 (2001). 
331 Nava, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 890-91 (emphasis added) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 
830, 841 n.3 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)). 
332 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 n.3 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) 
333 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020). 
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protections beyond those afforded in removal proceedings, they fall outside 
the reach of § 1252(b)(9). This has been particularly pronounced in cases 
where right-to-counsel claims fall outside the reach of § 1252(b)(9).334 
In Arroyo v. Department of Homeland Security, for example, a district court 
held that § 1252(b)(9) posed no jurisdictional barrier to claims of noncitizens 
who had an existing attorney-client relationship.335 Guided by Jennings, the 
court explained, “the nature of right violated guides the jurisdictional inquiry 
rather than the source of the right.”336 Under both the INA and Constitution, 
a noncitizen enjoys the “right not to have that relationship unduly burdened 
or interfered with.”337 The attorney–client relationship “carries with it certain 
rights separate from and additional to their rights in removal proceedings.”338 
Therefore, the alleged harm accrues at the moment that the relationship is 
burdened, without reference to the removal proceedings.339 In other words, 
the right asserted offers protections that extend beyond the bounds of removal 
proceedings, and thus, such claims could not “arise from” those proceedings. 
Torres v. Department of Homeland Security employed the same logic and 
extended it to cover unrepresented noncitizens in addition to already 
represented noncitizens.340 The court said that because the asserted rights 
extend beyond removal proceedings, an alleged violation of those rights are 
equally “apart from the removal process.”341 
The decision in Efrain and Mia’s case, E.O.H.C.—which otherwise 
centered on reviewability—also discussed the “nature of the right,” 
specifically with regard to the right-to-counsel claim.342 The Third Circuit 
found that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar the father and daughter’s constitutional 
right-to-counsel claims because there are certain rights separate from and 
 
334 Right-to-counsel claims present perhaps the most complicated—or, at least, divisive—
questions about the scope of § 1252(b)(9). One district court summarized the state of the law as 
such: “The question of whether the Court would have jurisdiction over Plaintiff ’s access to counsel 
claim is a complicated one and the authorities are equipoise.” S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 18-760, 2020 WL 3265533, at *35 n.4 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020). This area of the 
law is ripe for further scholarship, given that the Supreme Court has yet to confront a right-to-
counsel claim, but these claims have been the subject of some of the most important § 1252(b)(9) 
circuit cases since the provision’s enactment. See, e.g., Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 510 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016); E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2020). 
335 Arroyo v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 





340 Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 
341 Id. 
342 E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020); Arroyo 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-815, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2019). 
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additional to those implicated in removal proceedings.343 Conversely, the 
court held that § 1252(b)(9) did bar the statutory claims because “the right is 
limited to [removal proceedings].”344 
While Torres and Arroyo differed from E.O.H.C. in holding that both the 
constitutional and statutory right to counsel extend beyond removal proceedings, 
the key takeaway is that a growing number of courts view the “nature of the right” 
as integral to their § 1252(b)(9) analysis.345 Since the bounds of a noncitizen’s 
right to counsel are unclear,346 noncitizens can and should construe them as 
expansively as possible to circumvent the strictures of § 1252(b)(9). Under the 
logic adopted in Torres and Arroyo, if any part of the asserted right falls outside 
the confines of removal proceedings, those claims do not “arise from” such 
proceedings and thus § 1252(b)(9) poses no jurisdictional bar. 
4. Three Challenges Approach 
A widely used inquiry that comes directly from the Jennings plurality can 
be described as the “three challenges approach.” It is taken from the plurality’s 
suggestion that it was “enough” for “present purposes” that the noncitizens 
in the case were “not asking for review of an order of removal; they [were] 
not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek 
removal; and they [were] not even challenging any part of the process by 
which their removability will be determined.”347 
As noted in the introduction to this Section, if claims are not directed toward 
one of these three categories, the analysis ends and § 1252(b)(9) must not apply. 
In Regents, for example, the Court found that a challenge to the rescission of a 
deferred action policy did not fall within § 1252(b)(9) because those bringing 
suit were “not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision . . . to seek 
removal, or the process by which . . . removability will be determined.”348 
Likewise, the district court in Vasquez Cruz v. Barr found that because the 
noncitizen’s objection to continued detention was not directed at any of the 
three challenges enumerated in Jennings, § 1252(b)(9) posed no jurisdictional 
barrier.349 The same was true in Al Otro Lado, where the court allowed 
challenges to asylum policies to proceed in district court, partially because 
 
343 E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 188. 
344 Id. at 187. 
345 See, e.g., id. at 186; Arroyo, 2019 WL 2912848, at *13. 
346 See MANUEL supra note 100 (discussing noncitizens’ right to counsel in removal proceedings). 
347 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) 
348 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020). The 
Court added that § 1252(b)(9) was “certainly not a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging 
any removal proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added). 
349 Vasquez Cruz v. Barr, No. 19-05251, 2019 WL 6327576, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019). 
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they did not implicate any of Jennings’ three challenges.350 Courts have 
similarly found that claims challenging the denial of bond petitions,351 ICE 
conduct,352 and an ICE field office detention policy353 do not fall within one 
of the three categories and thus fall outside § 1252(b)(9)’s reach. 
In contrast, several courts have analogized the claims before them to one 
of the “three challenges” to find that § 1252(b)(9) bars jurisdiction. This is 
problematic for several reasons. For one, the Supreme Court has only held 
that claims that do not challenge any of the three categories fall outside the 
ambit of § 1252(b)(9).354 It has not held that the reverse is true—that where 
claims do challenge one of the three categories that they automatically fall 
within the reach of § 1252(b)(9). In any event, the second and third of the 
enumerated categories are imprecisely defined.355 Courts using those two 
categories as the basis for sweeping claims into § 1252(b)(9) risk painting the 
provision’s scope with too broad a brush. It is worthwhile to address each of 
the “three challenges” in turn, although the first can be disposed of quickly. 
a. “Review of an Order of Removal” 
The Jennings plurality first listed “review of an order of removal” as a 
challenge swept into § 1252(b)(9).356 This type of challenge is essentially 
restating the crux of § 1252(b)(9), so it offers nothing new. In fact, such 
challenges would even be barred under the Jennings dissent’s interpretation, 
which reads § 1252(b)(9) quite narrowly. 
 
350 Al Otro Lado, Inc v. McAleenan, 432 F. Supp. 3d 848, 863 (S.D. Cal. 2019) 
351 See Torosyan v. Nielsen, No. 18-5873, 2018 WL 5784708, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018) 
(distinguishing a challenge to decision to detain petitioner without bail from a challenge arising 
from action taken to remove the petitioner); Monterosa v. Decker, No. 20-02653, 2020 WL 1847771 
at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2020) (finding district court jurisdiction where petitioner challenged his 
detention without bond). 
352 See Tun-Cos, v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) 
(finding district court jurisdiction in an action seeking damages after law enforcement agents 
allegedly violated plaintiff ’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights). 
353 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(concluding that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar district court jurisdiction over class action challenges to 
the conditions of detention). 
354 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is enough 
to note that respondents are not asking for review [of one of the three categories].” (emphasis added)). 
355 The second category includes claims challenging the decision to detain or to seek removal 
in the first place. Id. The third category includes claims challenging “any part of the process by which 
removability will be determined.” Id. 
356 Id. 
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b. “Decision to Detain [Noncitizens] in the First Place or to Seek Removal” 
The second of the three categories of claims are those directed at the 
“decision to detain [noncitizens] in the first place or to seek removal.”357 
Notably, this mirrors the language of § 1252(b)(9)’s neighboring provision, 
§ 1252(g), which bars challenges “arising from the decision or action by the 
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
removal orders against any alien.”358 
Nonetheless, the district court in Cancino-Castellar partially relied on this 
language from Jennings to hold that § 1252(b)(9) channeled claims contesting 
detention without a prompt probable cause determination.359 The court reasoned 
that the prompt presentment claim “plainly ‘challenges the decision to detain 
them in the first place’ . . . [because it] expressly challenged ‘decisions to keep 
persons in custody beyond 48 hours and before their initial Master Calendar 
Hearing . . . without prompt judicial review.’”360 Even though the claim seems to 
challenge how they were detained—the circumstances of detention—the court 
folded this claim into the government’s decision to “detain them in the first place” 
and thus the claim fell within the restrictions of § 1252(b)(9).361 
Another similar case came out the other way. In Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement Chicago Field Office—a case unrelated to the First 
Circuit’s Aguilar decision—plaintiffs brought claims to district court challenging 
ICE’s policy of failing to promptly initiate removal proceedings, thus forcing 
people to wait days or weeks in custody before seeing an immigration judge.362 
During that period, ICE did not provide detainees a particularized statement of 
probable cause nor a probable cause determination.363 These claims were almost 
identical to those in Cancino-Castellar. Despite acknowledging the same “detain 
in the first place” language from Jennings, the court found that § 1252(b)(9) did 
not apply because the plaintiffs, “like the Jennings plaintiffs,” were only 
challenging the circumstances of their detention.364 
Reconciling these two cases presents a challenge. One plausible explanation 
for Cancino-Castellar’s reading of § 1252(b)(9) is that unlike those in Aguilar, the 
claims in Cancino-Castellar, which fell into § 1252(b)(9), did not involve a “policy 
 
357 Id. 
358 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (interpreting § 1252(g) narrowly as applying only to the 
statute’s enumerated actions). 
359 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (emphasis added). 
360 Id. 
361 Id. (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)). 
362 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1178-81 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
363 Id. at 1179. 
364 Id. at 1183-84 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)). 
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in which individuals are detained without probable cause.”365 Rather, the court 
in Cancino-Castellar characterized the claims as concerning “the mere fact than 
an immigration officer has taken any action at all against the Plaintiffs and the 
putative class.”366 But that characterization is divorced from the language of the 
complaint, which alleged the government had a “policy and practice of detaining 
individuals for extended periods without promptly presenting them for an 
initial hearing before an immigration judge.”367 
In addition, like those in Aguilar, the plaintiffs in Cancino-Castellar alleged 
that individuals “‘routinely languish in detention for two months or longer 
before they see a judge’ because of [the] alleged policy.”368 Therefore, the 
claims in Cancino-Castellar and Aguilar are almost indistinguishable. Whereas 
one court found them to be challenging circumstances of detention and 
therefore not barred by § 1252(b)(9), another found them to be challenging 
the government’s decision to detain or remove noncitizens in the first place 
and thus swallowed by the provision.369 
The foregoing discussion reveals the risk involved in using the second 
category of the three challenges approach as a reason to sweep claims into 
§ 1252(b)(9). The initial decision to detain a noncitizen could be read broadly, 
like it was in Cancino-Castellar, to encompass claims that are really too remote 
from removal proceedings.370 Willing courts could read this language so 
broadly that § 1252(b)(9) would apply to claims challenging ICE’s conduct in 
its initial stop and detention simply because it could be analogized to a 
decision to detain individuals “in the first place.”371 
But it must not be so. Courts should resolve such close calls resulting from 
this ambiguous language in favor of the noncitizen for two reasons. First, the 
Supreme Court has consistently recognized a strong presumption in favor of 
judicial review, especially in the immigration context.372 Second, the Court 
 
365 Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1115 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (emphasis added). 
366 Id. at 1116. 
367 Id. at 1109 (emphasis added). 
368 Id. (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)). 
369 Id. (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion)); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. 
& Customs Enf ’t, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
370 Cancino-Castellar, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (quoting Justice Alito’s analysis in Jennings, 138 S. 
Ct. at 841 n.3). Separately, noncitizens with prompt presentment claims may also invoke the 
timeframe consideration because their claims occur before the initiation of removal proceedings. 
Moreover, they may also use the illegal conduct consideration from Justice Thomas’s concurrence. 
Arguably, these claims challenge illegal ICE conduct during pre-hearing detention. See infra 
subsection III.B.5. 
371 Cancino-Castellar, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) 
(plurality opinion)). 
372 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020) (explaining that the Court has 
“consistently applied” the “strong” and “well-settled” presumption in favor of judicial review to 
immigration statutes). See also McNary v. Haitan Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) 
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has now repeatedly urged a narrow reading of “arising from,” and accordingly, 
when courts employ the second of the “three challenges approach,” they must 
do so with caution and err on the side of preserving judicial review.373 
c. “Any Part of the Process by Which [] Removability [Would] Be Determined” 
The third of the “three challenges approach” implicates a small subset of claims 
that object to the processes “by which . . . removability will be determined.”374 
Since Jennings, the “third challenge” has been used primarily to channel 
claims contesting the use of videoconference technology in removal 
proceedings. P.L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the leading 
case and has been cited in two subsequent videoconference technology cases 
that came out the same way.375 At issue was a new policy adopted by the ICE 
New York Field Office whereby it would no longer bring detained noncitizens 
to immigration court but would instead conduct removal proceedings 
remotely through videoconference technology.376 
In addition to technological issues that caused delays, which resulted in 
longer periods of detention, organizational plaintiffs alleged that the policy 
prevented them from meaningfully participating in removal proceedings.377 
The court determined that, “[h]ow immigrants appear for removal proceedings 
constitutes part of the process of these proceedings.”378 Thus, § 1252(b)(9) 
precludes jurisdiction because “Plaintiffs are challenging, by seeking to enjoin, 
a ‘part of the process by which . . . removability will be determined . . . .’”379 
 
(recognizing a “well-settled presumption . . . that allow[s] judicial review of administrative 
action . . . .”) (citing Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986)); see 
also Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962) (refusing to deny judicial review in the absence of 
“clear and convincing evidence that Congress so intended”); Benson, supra note 25, at 1458 
(“Litigants [trying to evade the strictures of § 1252(b)(9)] will also rely on the long line of cases 
which hold that courts should narrowly construe statutes which seek to limit judicial review and, 
absent the express intent of Congress, should preserve review of constitutional challenges.”). Benson 
cites several cases that “reflect the presumption of preserving judicial review, especially for 
constitutional questions.” Id. at 1458-59 n.215. 
373 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840-41 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Court must read 
“capacious phrases” like “arising from” narrowly, as it did in AADC); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (describing the provision as “targeted” and “narrow”). 
374 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
375 See Flores Valle v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-2254, 2019 WL 7756069, at *1, *5 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2019) (challenging the use of videoconference technology in ICE’s Dallas Field 
Office); Rivas Rosales v. Barr, No. 20-00888, 2020 WL 1505682, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020) 
(challenging the use of videoconference technology in individual removal proceedings). 
376 P.L. v. U.S. Immigr. Customs Enf ’t, No. 19-01336, 2019 WL 2568648, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 21, 2019). 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at *3. 
379 Id. 
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Although only a few courts outside the videoconference technology context 
have explored it,380 this language from Jennings must be construed narrowly. 
Under a broad reading, it could sweep a wide swath of claims into § 1252(b)(9). 
For example, Efrain and Mia challenged the Trump administration’s MPP 
policy.381 In the context of the three challenges approach, the government might 
have argued that the policy is part and parcel of the process by which 
removability will be determined—in this instance, at the U.S.-Mexican border. 
But because this is the type of “cramming judicial review” that would be 
“absurd,” courts must avoid reading this third category of claims too broadly 
and overlook that explicit warning from Jennings.382 
Claims such as those in the videoconference technology cases may struggle 
to find their way into federal district court given this language from Jennings. 
Noncitizens could frame videoconference technology or similar claims as 
challenges to the circumstances of detention, or assert that their right to 
counsel has been violated, although such arguments failed in P.L.383 Without 
alternative strategies, though, the third category of the “three challenges 
approach” seems to sweep these types of claims into the ambit of § 1252(b)(9). 
5. Effect on Removal Proceedings 
Another factor that courts use when analyzing “arising from” is whether 
granting relief would have bearing on the underlying merits of removal 
proceedings. This factor is most frequently used in challenges where a removal 
order has already become final, but after Jennings, a similar consideration has 
made its way into a small subset of pre-removal order challenges as well.384 
For example, a noncitizen challenged his continued detention during 
removal proceedings on the grounds that he was not subject to mandatory 
detention.385 The court held that because the resolution of the continued 
 
380 See e.g., Ali v. Barr, 464 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (holding claims that sought 
to enjoin filing deadlines until after the government lifted the stay-at-home orders related to the 
pandemic were part of the process by which removability will be determined and thus fell into the 
scope of § 1252(b)(9)). 
381 See Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 1. 
382 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
383 See supra notes 376-379 and accompanying text. 
384 See supra note 132 (describing cases where courts have deployed § 1252(a)(5) without 
§ 1252(b)(9)). 
385 See Torosyan v. Nielsen, No. 18-5873, 2018 WL 5784708, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018) 
(summarizing petitioner’s argument that it was unlawful to subject him to mandatory detention, as 
doing so contravened the text of 8 U.S.C § 1226 and created a “new category of offenses eligible for 
mandatory detention that Congress did not authorize”). 
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detention claims “will neither invalidate nor imply the invalidity of any 
removal order he might face,” they cannot be channeled by § 1252(b)(9).386 
Likewise, in a challenge to various government asylum policies brought 
by a number of organizational plaintiffs, the court held § 1252(b)(9) did not 
foreclose jurisdiction, partially because “Plaintiffs are not challenging any 
removal order, nor would granting a remedy require any removal order to be 
overturned.”387 In other words, because the court’s decision would have no 
effect on any singular removal proceeding, it skirted the reach of § 1252(b)(9). 
When this consideration functions to bar claims, it only operates in a small 
subset of pre-removal order challenges: where no removal order has been 
issued but some other agency decision has already been made such that 
granting relief sought would effectively negate that agency decision. Such was 
the case in Gomez, where the district court was confronted with a challenge to 
the policy of placing applicants for cancellation of removal in a “queue,” rather 
than immediately issuing a visa.388 The court held § 1252(b)(9) precluded 
jurisdiction because if the district court were to grant relief, it would “have the 
effect of negating an order of removal, should one be issued.”389 
This consideration must be confined to this narrow group of pre-removal-
order cases for two reasons. First, it cannot apply conceptually in most other 
situations. For this consideration to operate, there must have been some 
ancillary administrative decision made, overturning which would 
substantially affect a future removal order. Second, to the extent that it could 
be applied in other contexts, it might be construed too broadly. Anything 
could have some effect on the validity of a future removal order, even if the 
effect were attenuated. But in the words of the Jennings plurality, such claims 
are “too remote” to be “arising from” removal proceedings.390 Therefore, this 
consideration has little relevance in pre-removal order challenges. 
 
386 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). See also Tun-Cos, v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 
(E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) (holding that noncitizens’ Bivens claims are not channeled by § 1252(b)(9) 
because their “success or lack of success . . . will have absolutely no effect on the removal proceedings”). 
387 Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Ctr. v. Trump, No. 19-20051, 2020 WL 4431682, at *8 
(D. Or. July 31, 2020). 
388 Gomez v. McAleenan, No. 19-04199, 2019 WL 5722619, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019). 
389 Id. at *4; see also Nikolic v. Decker, No. 19-6047-LTS, 2019 WL 5887500, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 12, 2019) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) channels claims that allege failure to accommodate 
noncitizen’s disabilities because they “cannot be remedied without first invalidating the final order 
of removal that has been entered against him,” though it was pending appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals); Calmo v. Sessions, No. C 17-07124, 2018 WL 2938628, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 
12, 2018) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) channels claims that challenge continued detention because “we 
cannot review one without reviewing the other,” referring to the removal order). 
390 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 n.3 (2018) (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
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6. An Action Taken or Proceeding Brought 
The final consideration pertains not to “arising from” but rather to the 
language that follows. Section 1252(b)(9) states that the provision only 
applies to legal questions “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to 
remove an alien from the United States . . . .” 391  If a noncitizen’s claims do 
not challenge an “action taken or proceeding brought to remove” her, those 
claims would necessarily fall outside the ambit of § 1252(b)(9).  
The only Supreme Court guidance on this part of the provision comes from 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Jennings, which interpreted § 1252(b)(9) 
extremely broadly. There, Justice Thomas delineated between actions that are 
“congressionally authorized” or “meant to ensure that an alien can be 
removed” and those that “go beyond the Government’s lawful pursuit of its 
removal objective.”392 According to Justice Thomas, claims challenging the 
former—like those in Jennings—are swept into § 1252(b)(9), whereas those 
challenging the latter likely fall outside the provision’s scope.393  
For example, courts have agreed that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar Bivens 
claims brought by noncitizens that challenge ICE’s allegedly illegal conduct 
when initially stopping and detaining the noncitizens.394 Drawing from 
language in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, two courts found it significant that 
the noncitizens were not challenging conduct that was “congressionally 
authorized” nor “meant to ensure that an alien can be removed.”395 Instead, 
the noncitizens were challenging “actions that go beyond the Government’s 
lawful pursuit of its removal objective[s]” and challenges to such actions 
cannot be swept into the reach of § 1252(b)(9). 
This consideration could be broadened and applied in contexts outside of 
Bivens claims. For example, in the videoconference technology cases 
discussed above, a noncitizen could argue that indiscriminate deployment of 
videoconference technology in lieu of in-person hearings is a 
noncongressionally-authorized action taken to remove a noncitizen.396 
Relying on Justice Thomas’s concurrence, a court might reasonably conclude 
that such a challenge falls outside of the reach of § 1252(b)(9). 
 
391 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added). 
392 Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
393 Id. 
394 See Tun-Cos, v. Perrotte, No. 17-943, 2018 WL 3616863, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2020) (concluding 
that the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims were outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9)); Nava v. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
plaintiff ’s complaint alleging Fourth Amendment violations for lack of jurisdiction). 
395 Tun-Cos, 2018 WL 3616863 at *6 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see also Nava, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“[I]n Jennings, the Court’s discussion of detention as an action 
taken to remove a non-citizen appears to have contemplated lawful detention.”) (emphasis in original). 
396 See supra note 375 and accompanying text (discussing videoconference technology cases). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court took an important step in Jennings to narrow the 
scope of § 1252(b)(9). But because it failed to provide a comprehensive 
interpretation of the provision, lower courts have been tasked with 
effectuating the narrow reading Jennings counsels. This Comment seeks to 
provide those courts with the tools necessary to effectuate that reading. 
Whether lower courts interpret § 1252(b)(9) narrowly is not merely a 
matter of adhering to Supreme Court precedent. Their reading of the 
provision has significant practical consequences for noncitizens, who must 
frequently seek urgent relief in federal district court. Whether it is a group 
of hundreds of noncitizen workers rounded up in an ICE raid and fast-tracked 
for deportation, or a father and daughter facing imminent expulsion to 
Mexico, the federal district court is often the best and potentially only forum 
where noncitizens can meaningfully seek relief. But when an executive can 
take harsh action against noncitizens and then wield § 1252(b)(9) to preclude 
any judicial review of its alleged abuses, immigrants are mired in a catch-22. 
For that reason, it is essential that § 1252(b)(9)—and provisions like it—
are read narrowly. Jennings was an important step, but more must be done. 
Federal courts now must clearly and consistently apply a narrow 
interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) to ensure noncitizens have fundamental access 
to justice. The difference, after all, can be one of life and death. 
  
2021] Noncitizens’ Access to Federal District Courts 845 
APPENDIX: CHART OF MAJOR § 1252(b)(9) CASES SINCE JENNINGS 
This chart, recent as of November 17, 2020, compiles all the non-Supreme 
Court cases since Jennings that cite and discuss § 1252(b)(9) with some level 
of detail. Those that merely cite the provision or mention it only in passing 
are not included in this chart. The chart is organized first by the type of claim, 
with the intent that similar claims appear in consecutive order, and then by 
jurisdiction, which is organized by circuit.  
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